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1. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures" and
ensures that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause."1  The precise
wording of these two clauses creates difficult questions, including whether a search
warrant is generally required to satisfy the Fourth Amendment,2 what makes a
warrantless search "reasonable," 3 and whether a police officer's subjective
motivations should affect the reasonableness of a particular warrantless search.4 In
1967, in answering the first of these questions, the Supreme Court declared that
warrants are generally required for police to conduct a valid Fourth Amendment
search.' However, over the next two decades, the Court created a host of exceptions
to that rule such that, by the late 1990s, the exceptions had seemingly swallowed the
rule.6
1U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 183 n.1 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(discussing the origins of the Fourth Amendment and arguing that the Amendment
"presupposed that an 'unreasonable' search could be avoided only by use of a warrant," and
that "[i]t did not conceive of warrantless searches") (citing NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 97-
103 (1970)).
3As it turns out, the Supreme Court typically evaluates the reasonableness of a particular
warrantless search by weighing the governmental interests at stake against the competing
privacy interests. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967) (in context of
administrative inspections, Court declared that "[i]n determining whether a particular
[warrantless] inspection is reasonable... the need for the inspection must be weighed in terms
of these reasonable goals of code enforcement"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-27 (1968)
(balancing "the nature and extent of the governmental interests involved" against "the nature
and quality of the intrusion on individual rights" to determine the reasonableness of a
warrantless police search and seizure); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 125-27 (2006)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that "the Fourth Amendment does not insist upon bright-line
rules," but instead requires courts to examine the "totality of the circumstances" to determine
the "reasonableness" of a particular search).
4 See JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
Vol. 1, at 167-68 (4th ed. 2006).
5See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
6See DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 4, at 173.
[Vol. 56:663
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The most far-reaching exception to the warrant requirement is consent.7 So far-
reaching, in fact, that legal commentators have begun calling for elimination of the
consent exception.8 In 2006, in Georgia v. Randolph,9 the U.S. Supreme Court took
an unusual step toward reining in the consent exception.'0 Prior to Randolph, the
rule of United States v. Matlock" was that the consent of any residential occupant is
sufficient for police to conduct a warrantless search of shared premises where police
discover evidence used to convict an absent co-occupant.' 2 The Matlock Court based
its ruling on the assumption of risk doctrine, reasoning that co-tenants "assume the
risk" that a roommate might allow police to search their shared premises. 3
In Illinois v. Rodriguez,4 the Court extended Matlock to cover warrantless entries
of shared quarters when based on the consent of a person whom the police
reasonably, but incorrectly, believe has common authority over the premises. 5 The
Court upheld the consent search in Rodriguez despite the fact that the defendant was
asleep inside the home at the time of the consent request. 6 Thus, by 1990, police
could lawfully conduct a warrantless search of jointly occupied property when a
suspect is located on the premises at the time of consent, but the suspect is left out of
the consent inquiry and the consenter has no actual authority to permit entry.
Extending the rationale of Matlock and Rodriguez, lower courts in the 1990s
expanded the consent exception to validate searches where consent is obtained from
an absent occupant and the occupant actually located on the premises expressly
objects to the search.'7 By failing to honor the wishes of the physically present co-
7See RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS,
PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTICES 21 (National Center for State Courts 1984).
8See, e.g., Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211
(2002) (arguing that consent searches should be entirely eliminated).
9547 U.S. 103 (2006).
"'See Nathan S. Lew, Nothing to be Worried About: Consent Searches After Georgia v.
Randolph, 28 WHITTIER L. REv. 1067, 1067 (2007) (arguing that "by limiting the expansion of
the consent doctrine, the Court has strengthened Fourth Amendment protections to be free
from unreasonable searches .
"415 U.S. 164 (1974).
21d. at 164.
13The Matlock Court justified its ruling on the assumption of risk doctrine, declaring that
"it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the
inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number
might permit the common area to be searched." Id. at 171 n.7.
14497 U.S. 177 (1990).
5See id. at 183-89.
'6See id. at 179-80.
17See, e.g., People v. Sanders, 904 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Colo. 1995) ("Valid consent of a
person with 'common authority' will justify a warrantless search of a residence despite the
physical presence of a nonconsenting co-occupant."); United States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31, 33
(1st Cir. 1992) (holding that valid consent given by a third party with "common authority" is
valid even when defendant specifically objects to it); United States v. Childs, 944 F.2d 491,
494 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the consent of a co-occupant with "common authority"
2008]
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tenant, these decisions deemed the consent of one tenant per se valid as against a co-
tenant's express refusal of consent.
In response to this extension of the Matlock-Rodriguez rationale, Randolph held
that an occupant's consent to search is no longer valid where a physically present co-
occupant himself refuses to consent. 8 However, the Randolph Court was careful to
confine its rule to situations where a co-tenant both (1) is physically present at the
time of the consent request and (2) expressly objects to the search. 9 Adopting a
strict interpretation of the physical presence and express objection requirements, the
Court refused to overrule Matlock, in effect permitting officers in future encounters
to arrest and detain a likely objector, so long as the arrest is lawful, before requesting
consent from the suspect's co-occupant.
With Matlock left intact, the Court feared that police might circumvent Randolph
by deliberately removing a likely objector from the scene before requesting consent.
In attempting to tie up this "loose end,"2 the Court made the following qualification:
This is the line we draw, and we think the formalism is justified. So long
as there is no evidence that the police have removed the potentially
objecting tenant from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible
objection, there is practical value in the simple clarity of complementary
rules, one recognizing the co-tenant's permission when there is no fellow
occupant on hand, the other according dispositive weight to the fellow
occupant's contrary indication when he expresses it.2'
The Court's solution to prevent arbitrary application of its already narrow rule22
may have created more problems than it sought to prevent.23  In his Randolph
justifies a warrantless search even if the defendant is present and regardless of whether the
defendant consents). But see State v. Leach, 782 P.2d 1035 (Wash. 1989) (holding that
cohabitant's consent to search is insufficient to justify warrantless search where defendant is
present and able to object).
18In the words of the Randolph Court: "This case invites a straightforward application of
the rule that a physically present inhabitant's express refusal of consent to a police search is
dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant." Georgia v. Randolph,
547 U.S. 103, 122-23 (2006).
19See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121-22.
2
°See id. at 120-21 (addressing two "loose ends," the second being "the significance of
Matlock and Rodriguez after today's decision").
2
'id. at 121-22 (emphasis added).
22See Leslie McCall, Casenote, Georgia v. Randolph: Whose Castle Is It, Anyway?, 41 U.
RICH. L. REv. 589, 601-02 (2007) (noting the narrowness of the Randolph holding, in light of
the Court's refusal to overrule Matlock and Rodriguez). See also Craig M. Bradley, The Case
of the Uncooperative Husband, 42 TRIAL 68, 70 (2006) (concluding that, despite its strong
dissenting opinions, "Randolph creates an extremely narrow rule").
23See George M. Dery, III & Michael J. Hernandez, Blissful Ignorance? The Supreme
Court's Signal to Police in Georgia v. Randolph to Avoid Seeking Consent to Search from All
Occupants of a Home, 40 CoNN. L. REv. 53, 80-83 (2007). In recognizing this same concern,
the authors noted:
Randolph's rule provides an incentive to police not only to separate the parties at a
residence, but to isolate the individual most likely to refuse consent to entry. Perhaps
[Vol. 56:663
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dissent, Chief Justice Roberts worried that "[t]he majority's analysis alters a great
deal of established Fourth Amendment law."24  In particular, the Chief Justice
worried that "the majority considers a police officer's subjective motive in asking for
consent, which we have otherwise refrained from doing in assessing Fourth
Amendment questions."25  The Chief Justice declared, "This Court has rejected
subjective motivations of police officers in assessing Fourth Amendment questions,2 6
... with good reason: The police do not need a particular reason to ask for consent to
search, whether for signs of domestic violence or evidence of drug possession. "27
In light of the majority's qualification, the Chief Justice was concerned that post-
Randolph courts would routinely question whether police acted with the purpose of
avoiding a likely consent objection, a task which necessarily and impractically
probes into the subjective motivations of law enforcement.
It has been over two years since Randolph was decided. In that time, a variety of
lower courts have addressed arguments of criminal defendants seeking to either
apply or extend the Randolph rule. After carefully analyzing nearly every post-
anticipating this trouble, Justice Souter attached a caveat to Randolph's distinction
between the absent and the present (and objecting) occupant: "So long as there is no
evidence that the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the
entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible objection ...." Yet, in warding off one
problem, the Court unfortunately stumbled into another. Randolph's limitation would
force courts to attempt to divine the underlying motivation for an officer's physically
moving one person away from the scene, an analysis explicitly repudiated in Whren v.
United States [517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)]. Whren flatly ruled that "subjective intent
alone .. .does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional."...
Whren further intoned that it had "repeatedly held and asserted" that an officer's
motive does not invalidate "objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth
Amendment."
Id. at 82-83.
24Randolph, 547 U.S. at 141 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
251d
261n a series of Fourth Amendment cases, beginning in 1925 with Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925), the Supreme Court has explicitly exempted from Fourth Amendment
scrutiny any inquiry into whether law enforcement has detained an individual for pretextual
reasons-the most commonly asserted pretext being detainment on account of race. See, e.g.,
David A. Harris, "'Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court
and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 559 (1997) (listing
statements by police officers such as the following: "You can always get a guy legitimately on
a traffic violation if you tail him for a while, and then a search can be made."). The modem
connection between racial profiling and the Fourth Amendment begins with the Court's
controversial comments in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). In Whren, the Court
held that as long as probable cause objectively exists to conduct an arrest or automobile search,
a court may not consider (under the Fourth Amendment) an officer's subjective motivations,
even if the defendant's race was the sole motivating factor behind the officer's conduct. See
id. at 813. The Court felt instead that "the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally
discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth
Amendment," ignoring the fact that to succeed on an equal protection claim, the challenger
would have to prove an intent to discriminate, which would force the reviewing court to
consider the police officer's subjective motivations anyway. Id.
"Randolph, 547 U.S. 138.
2008]
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Randolph opinion providing more than a cursory discussion of the Randolph claim, 8
this Article addresses Chief Roberts's concerns by examining whether Randolph is
truly a watershed case authorizing greater judicial scrutiny of police officer
subjective motivations in Fourth Amendment analysis.
This Article concludes that Randolph is not the watershed case Chief Justice
Roberts feared. Indeed, the reaction has been quite the opposite. Rather than
delving into police officer motivations, post-Randolph courts have developed at least
five ways to reject an otherwise legitimate Randolph claim: (1) by giving the
defendant the difficult burden of proving that police intentionally removed him from
the scene for purposes of avoiding a Randolph-type situation; (2) by failing to infer
the specific poor motive required by Randolph even where the defendant has
presented evidence of police deception; (3) by permitting police to avoid a likely
objector through either failing to request consent from a physically present suspected
wrongdoer, or by planning a consent request at a time when police know the
potential objector will not be home; (4) by siding with the police in a "he-said-she-
said" situation, thereby defeating a defendant's claim that he actually objected to the
search; and (5) by eliminating from consideration actual express refusals of consent
that are not sufficiently unequivocal, precise, and definite.2"
Because the vast majority of lower courts post-Randolph have strictly construed
Randolph's physical presence and express objection requirements, Randolph is not
the watershed case the dissenters feared."0 Indeed, not a single post-Randolph court
has struck down an otherwise valid search under Randolph's admonishment of
unjustifiable pretext. In addition, only two cases have explicitly extended the
Randolph rule, one of which was later vacated,3 and neither doing so on the grounds
feared by the Randolph dissenters.3 2 Moreover, because most currently published
28See Appendix A for the full list of the reviewed cases.
29The first three of these five listed methods restrict Randolph's physical presence
requirement; the last two effectively confine the express objection requirement.
30other commentators have made similar observations. See, e.g., Adrienne Wineholt,
Georgia v. Randolph: Checking Potential Defendants' Fourth Amendment Rights at the Door,
66 MD. L. REV. 475, 490-98 (2007) (arguing that Randolph's "bright-line rule" insufficiently
protects Fourth Amendment rights and will result in the weakening of potential defendants'
Fourth Amendment rights); Bradley, supra note 22, at 68-69 (describing how Randolph "went
out of its way to stress the narrowness of its opinion" and stating that the rule "is so narrow
that it's hard to see why it generated any dissent at all"). See also Renee E. Williams, Note,
Third Party Consent Searches After Georgia v. Randolph: Dueling Approaches to the Dueling
Roommates, 87 B.U. L. REV. 937, 951-57 (2007) (noting that Randolph signals a potential
change in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by giving more protection to defendants' privacy
rights, but concluding that the true effect of Randolph remains to be seen).
31See United States v. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2006), reh 'g en banc granted and
opinion vacated, rev'den banc, 518 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2008). The panel opinion, which was
later reversed by the full court, had extended Randolph's physical presence requirement by
invalidating consent of defendant's wife to search their marital home where defendant had
previously denied consent while in police custody, but was not physically present at the time
wife consented to search.
32See Commonwealth v. Snow, 80 Pa. D. & C.4th 262 (Pa. Ct. Com. PI. 2006) (extending
Randolph's protection to invalidate a search where the defendant came out of the shower and
objected to a search that had already been underway pursuant to his wife's valid consent).
[Vol. 56:663
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lower court opinions considering Randolph claims involve consent searches
conducted prior to March 2006 when Randolph was decided, Randolph's protections
are likely to diminish further.
Before examining the five categories of post-Randolph case law, Part II of this
article summarizes the Randolph decision with emphasis on the Court's express
limitations of its rule. Part III describes various post-Randolph cases that illustrate
the first two categories of cases. Part IV provides examples of cases falling within
category three. Part V summarizes cases that hinge on the sufficiency of a purported
refusal of consent, thereby encompassing case categories four and five.
Before turning to the article's proposal, Part VI reviews two opinions that have
explicitly extended Randolph. The final Part contends that, in light of the lower
courts' dismantling of Randolph, the Supreme Court must either allow Randolph to
die a slow death of narrow interpretation or strengthen Randolph by expanding its
physical presence and express objection requirements. Part VII presents a solution
that would both strengthen Randolph, while simultaneously easing the concerns of
Randolph's dissenters by ensuring that officer motivations are not overly scrutinized.
The proposal in Part VII targets the express objection requirement.33 This
specific proposal would strengthen Randolph's protections in cases where the police
are aware that the defendant is physically present at the time of consent, but where
the dispute centers on the sufficiency of the defendant's purported objection. Under
this particular proposal, the burden of proving the defendant did not, in fact, object to
the warrantless search would shift to the prosecution in those cases where there is a
genuine conflict of evidence on this factual dispute. In particular, in situations where
a criminal defendant and at least one other witness claim that the defendant was
present and objected to the consent request but where the searching officers testify
otherwise, the government would be required to present additional evidence to defeat
the defendant's claim. This solution would maximize Fourth Amendment
protections in cases where the evidence of a particular front door exchange is
genuinely. disputed.34 Because this solution would likely cause law enforcement to
record (either by audio or video) their residential consent requests, this solution
would also foreclose inquiry into officer subjective motivations in such cases,
thereby easing the concerns of the Randolph dissenters.
II. RANDOLPH'S EXPRESS LIMITATIONS OF ITS RULE
Prior to Randolph, the Supreme Court in Matlock had ruled that "the consent of
one who possesses common authority . . . is valid as against the absent,
nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared."35 Because Matlock's rule
33Because the Randolph Court was explicitly concerned with preventing third party
consent cases from degenerating into "a test about the adequacy of the police's efforts to
consult with a potential objector," the physical presence requirement is not ripe for alteration.
See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 138 (2006).
341f the government were unable to meet this burden, the result would be similar to that in
People v. Mikrut, 864 N.E.2d 958 (I11. App. Ct. 2007), where the court upheld the trial court's
factual finding that the defendant did, in fact, object to the officers entering his home without a
warrant even though testimony of officers and defendant were contradictory.
35United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974).
2008]
HeinOnline  -- 56 Clev. St. L. Rev.  669 2008
8
Cleveland State Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 6
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss3/6
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
was expressly limited to "absent non-consenters, '36 lower courts post-Matlock
struggled with whether to extend Matlock to validate searches where joint occupants
are each physically present.
The Federal Courts of Appeal that had considered the issue had concluded that
consent of one occupant remains effective in the face of an express objection by a
physically present co-occupant. 37  Most state courts had also ruled against the
objecting defendant in such situations.38 However, some courts had concluded that
the consent of both parties is required when they are both physically present.39 The
Randolph Court granted certiorari to resolve the split.'
In Randolph, the defendant Scott Randolph and his wife, Janet, separated in May
2001. Shortly thereafter, Janet and her son left their home in Georgia and fled to
Canada.4 Two months later, Janet and the child returned. Upon her return, Janet
called the police complaining of a domestic dispute. When the police arrived, Janet
told the officers that her husband had taken their son away, that the defendant was a
cocaine user, and that there were illegal drugs in the house.42 The defendant returned
to the house and countered Janet's allegations by claiming that Janet, not himself,
had been abusing drugs. An officer then asked Scott Randolph for permission to
search the house, but he "unequivocally refused." ' The same officer then turned to
Janet and asked for her consent, which she readily gave. Upon searching the home,
officers seized a straw containing cocaine residue. After obtaining a search warrant,
officers returned to the house and seized additional evidence used to indict Scott
Randolph.'
36See id. at 169-71.
37See, e.g., United States v. Morning, 64 F.3d 531, 534-36 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Donlin, 982 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883, 885 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (per curiam); United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687-88 (6th Cir. 1977).
38See, e.g., Love v. State, 138 S.W.3d 676, 679-81 (Ark. 2003), abrogated by Georgia v.
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) (upholding consent of defendant's co-tenant even though
consent was obtained after the physically present defendant had refused consent); Laramie v.
Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 203-05 (Wyo. 1991) (same); State v. Frame, 609 P.2d 830, 833 (Or.
Ct. App. 1980); People v. Cosine, 397 N.E.2d 1319, 1321-23 (N.Y. 1979) (same); State v.
Vaster, 601 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (same).
39See, e.g., State v. Randolph, 604 S.E.2d 835, 837 (Ga. 2004) (distinguishing case from
Matlock because Scott Randolph was not "absent" from the colloquy in which the police
gained consent to search); State v. Leach, 782 P.2d 1035 (Wash. 1989) (en banc) (holding that
the state must prove that defendant did not object to the search to which a joint occupant
consented); United States v. Impink, 728 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1984) (reversing defendant's
conviction where lessor of a home gave police permission to search the home and where,
during the search, police failed to obtain the lessee's consent despite knowing he was present).
4"Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 108 (2006).
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Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that his
wife's consent could not override his explicit refusal of consent. The trial court
denied the motion, but both Georgia appellate courts ruled for the defendant.45 On
appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "a warrantless search of a shared dwelling
for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident
cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police
by another resident."'
Drawing an admittedly fine line," the Court emphasized that an objector who is
not "physically present" when consent is sought cannot obtain the protections of
Randolph. Refusing to overrule Matlock and Rodriguez, the Court stated that "the
potential objector, nearby but not invited to take part in the threshold colloquy, loses
out.
, 48
In addition to the requirements inherent in its rule-that the defendant be
"physically present" and that he indicate an "express refusal" of consent-the Court
explicitly limited its holding in three ways, creating exceptions for spousal abuse
victims, for "recognized hierarchies" of authority, and for exigent circumstances. 9
Aside from these three exceptions, the Randolph Court did not explicitly limit its
rule further.
I1. THE DEFENDANT'S DIFFICULT BURDEN UNDER RANDOLPH
"Randolph is a narrow holding, and no matter how hard [a criminal
defendant] wiggles-like the stepsisters trying to squeeze into
Cinderella's glass slipper-he can't fit within its embrace."5
45See Randolph v. State, 590 S.E.2d 834 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Randolph, 604
S.E.2d 835, 837 (Ga. 2004).
46Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120. The Supreme Court grounded its reasoning in "widely shared
social expectations," and declared that "a caller standing at the door of shared premises would
have no confidence that one occupant's invitation was a sufficiently good reason to enter when
a fellow tenant stood there saying, 'stay out."' See id. at 110-16.
47See id. at 120-21.
4 8 1d
49The Court first created an exception for the victims of spousal abuse, declaring that
"spousal abusers and other violent co-tenants" may not gain protection from the Randolph
rule. See id. at 117-18 ("The question whether the police might lawfully enter over objection
in order to provide any protection that might be reasonable is easily answered yes."). Second,
in dicta, the Court noted that its rule would not apply where the objecting co-tenant falls on the
short end of a "recognized hierarchy" of authority, such as the child in a parent-child
relationship or a lower-ranking officer in a military housing scenario. Id. at 114. Finally, the
Court noted that exigent circumstances might justify warrantless entry despite an express
objection by a physically present co-occupant. Id. at 117 n.6. As an example, the Court noted
that police may disregard a co-tenant's express objection where they have reason to believe
that the objector might destroy evidence of drug use before a warrant could be obtained. Id. at
117 n.6, 122-23.
5
°United States v. Wilbum, 473 F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2007).
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A. Post-Randolph Courts Require Defendant to Present Evidence that Police
Intentionally Removed Him from the Scene
Post-Randolph courts have explicitly acknowledged the Randolph requirement
that would strike down a co-tenant's otherwise valid consent where there is evidence
indicating the police removed a potential objector to avoid a possible consent
refusal.51 Courts explicitly recognizing this exception, however, have placed the
burden on the defendant to present actual evidence of such intentional removal.5
Most courts require a defendant to present evidence consisting of something more
than the defendant's own testimony that the police did, in fact, remove the potential
objector for the sake of avoiding a possible rejection. For example, in McClelland v.
State,53 in rejecting defendant's contention that he was separated from the consenter
so that his objection would not be heard, the court reasoned that "no such facts
appear in this record," and that the police instead "wanted to separate [defendant and
consenter] so that [they] could not... conspire to tell consistent stories."54
United States v. Parker55 is similarly illustrative. In Parker, police were called to
a house in South Bend, Indiana, in response to a report of a firearm discharge outside
the home. Upon arrival,56 officers observed defendant Parker exiting the house.
Officers took Parker into custody and placed him in a squad car. After detaining
Parker, officers obtained permission to search the house from co-tenant Linda
Johnson, who was on the premises at the time Parker was detained. In their
subsequent search of the home, officers located a rifle, which formed the basis for
prosecuting Parker.57
In addressing Parker's Randolph claim, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
noted that the "precise circumstances surrounding Parker's arrest are unclear from
51See, e.g., People v. Lapworth, 730 N.W.2d 258, 261 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) ("The
Supreme Court in Randolph did suggest that where the police purposely remove the suspect so
that the suspect will be unable to object, the cotenant's consent may not be sufficient."). See
also United States v. Williams, No. 06-20051-B, 2006 WL 3151548, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Nov.
1, 2006) (recognizing that police may not remove a defendant from the scene for the purpose
of avoiding a possible objection); United States v. Dominguez-Ramirez, No. 5:06-CR-6-OC-
10GRJ, 2006 WL 1704461, at *9 (M.D. Fl. June 8,2006) (unreported) (same).
52See, e.g., Williams, 2006 WL 3151548, at *5 (finding "no evidence" that police had
removed defendant from the scene for the purpose of removing a party who would have likely
objected to the search). See also Wilburn, 473 F.3d at 745 ("The facts in this case establish
that [the defendant] was not 'physically present' when [his live-in girlfriend] consented, and
the police did not deliberately remove him from the area to avoid hearing him invoke an
objection to the search. For these reasons, Randolph can offer [defendant] no comfort");
Dominguez-Ramirez, 2006 WL 1704461, at *9 (in upholding co-tenant consent search, court
reasoned that defendant, who was in custody at a distant location when his wife consented,
had presented no evidence that he had been removed from the premises in order to avoid his
possible objection).
"3155 P.3d 1013 (Wyo. 2007).
54See id. at 1019.
"5469 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 2006).
56See id. at 1078 n.3.
57See id. at 1075-76.
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the record."58  Indeed, the court admitted that it did not know "Parker's exact
location when the officers arrived at the house; whether the officers knocked on the
door or the door was open; or how or when exactly Officer Bartone arrested
Parker."59 Despite these uncertainties, the court analogized the case to Matlock:
Here, as in Matlock, the police had taken Parker into custody and removed
him from the premises before asking a co-tenant for her consent to search
the property .... Parker does not.., point to anything in the record that
even hints at the possibility that the police had taken him into custody as a
mechanism for coercing Johnson's consent. So Johnson's consent to the
search was valid as against Parker.6 °
While the Seventh Circuit explicitly acknowledged that police may not purposely
remove a potential objector to avoid a likely consent objection, the court was
extremely reluctant to infer any such motive in the face of an incomplete record.
In a similar vein, in United States v. Alama,61 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the defendant's argument that police had removed him from the scene to
avoid a possible consent refusal. In Alama, the defendant was charged with
methamphetamine production. Following his indictment, Alama was released on
bond, but soon violated the terms of his release. He was then spotted at the home of
his girlfriend's aunt, Jane Snelling. U.S. Marshals went to Snelling's home to arrest
Alama. The officers knocked on the door and ordered everyone out of the house.
Snelling and her relatives emerged and were taken across the street, but Alama
stayed behind in the home. As Alama was hiding in the home, Snelling consented to
a search of the property. Some time later, Alama came out of the house and was
immediately taken into custody. The officers then searched the home and found
drug evidence. Attempting to suppress this evidence, Alama argued that the police
knew he was physically present (thereby triggering potential application of the
Randolph rule) and that he would have objected to the search had they requested his
permission. Defendant argued that, having "ample opportunity to obtain [his]
consent," the police instead obtained Snelling's consent and simply waited until
Alama left the residence before conducting the search.6" The court disagreed. The
court reasoned that because Alama had not presented evidence to support his
unlawful intent argument, Randolph did not apply.63
581d. at 1078 n.3.
591d
"
601d. at 1078 (emphasis added).
61486 F.3d 1062 (8th Cir. 2007).
621d. at 1066.
6 31d. According to the court, "there is no evidence that Alama objected to the search after
his arrest and before the search occurred." Id. While not mentioned by the court in support of
its decision, the Alama court could have also justified its ruling on the fact that, upon their
arrival to the home, the police ordered all occupants out of the house and thereby did not
purposefully seek to avoid an encounter with Alama. Rather, it was Alama himself who
sought to avoid the police.
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In July 2007, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a similar argument in
United States v. McKerrell, 4 in which the defendant barricaded himself inside his
home and was immediately removed to the police station upon his voluntary
departure. In appealing the denial of his motion to suppress, 6 McKerrell argued that
Randolph's rule against purposeful removal applied. While McKerrell could point to
no evidence of intentional removal, he argued that because the officers actually
searched his residence after his removal, the court could infer that the officers had
planned to search the residence all along and hence removed him for the sake of
avoiding his objection.' Rejecting the argument, the Tenth Circuit declared:
McKerrell's argument begs the question by leaping to its conclusion from
the innocuous inference that the police searched McKerrell's residence
because they planned to do so "if the legal opportunity developed[.]"
Despite McKerrell's speculations, we must ask only whether the evidence
shows that the officers removed McKerrell from the scene to avoid his
possible objection. And on this point, there is no evidence that the police
removed McKerrell for this reason.
The evidence does show that the police removed McKerrell from the
scene and transported him to the police station to carry out a lawful arrest.
But McKerrell has not directed our attention to anything suspicious about
the procedures that the police employed. Instead, his analysis essentially
urges us to accept his unjustified speculations and circumvent Randolph's
evidentiary requirement .... Since there is no evidence that the police
prevented McKerrell from objecting to the search when he was at the
scene, and since there is no evidence that the officers removed McKerrell
for any reason other than completing the arrest, we have no reason to
[accept McKerrell's argument].67
As Parker, Alama, and McKerrell illustrate, lower courts post-Randolph have
explicitly recognized the Randolph prohibition of intentional removal, but typically
place the burden on the defendant to prove such removal through evidence beyond
his own self-serving testimony.
B. Post-Randolph Courts Are Reluctant to Infer Ill Motive
Even where defendants have presented actual evidence of poor police motive,
courts have been extremely reluctant to infer the specific ill motive required by
Randolph. In a recent case, the Seventh Circuit disregarded intentionally deceptive
police behavior that appeared to be for the purpose of securing a warrantless arrest
and simultaneously avoiding a Randolph situation.
In United States v. DiModica,68 after being charged with possession of a firearm
uncovered in a warrantless search of DiModica's home, DiModica argued the police
644 9 1 F.3d 1221, 1222-23 (10th Cir. 2007).
65See id. at 1224.
66Id. at 1228.
6 71d.
68468 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 2006).
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removed him from his home to avoid his likely objection to their search.69 In March
2004, DiModica's wife reported that she had been abused by her husband. She
informed the police that she lived with DiModica and that he likely had illegal drugs
and firearms in their home. Mrs. DiModica told the officers that her husband was
likely at home, and she gave them a key to the home and signed a written consent to
search form.
Shortly before midnight, officers drove to DiModica's residence in blizzard-like
conditions. Although the officers had probable cause to arrest DiModica, they did
not have an arrest warrant. Without an arrest warrant, officers would have been
unable to arrest DiModica absent DiModica's consent to enter the home."0
According to the Seventh Circuit:
The officers planned to tell DiModica [falsely] that Anita had been injured
in an automobile accident. They hoped that this would cause DiModica to
invite them into his home without any confrontation. Once invited inside,
the officers planned to arrest DiModica. At the suppression hearing,
[Officer] Smith testified that he and Officer Grimyser approached
DiModica's door together. Officer Grimyser knocked on DiModica's
door and when DiModica answered, Officer Grimyser ... told DiModica
that his wife had been badly injured in a car accident and asked if he could
come inside to talk to him. According to both officers, DiModica stepped
back and ushered the officers into the mudroom of the house. DiModica,
who was shirtless, then told the officers that he was going to retrieve a
shirt from another room in the house .... When DiModica returned to the
mudroom, Officer Grimyser arrested him for domestic abuse, placed him
in handcuffs, and escorted him to the squad car.7
Significantly, during the above encounter, the officers neither requested DiModica's
consent to search, nor did they inform him that they intended to conduct a search
upon his arrest.
At the suppression hearing, contrary to the officers' testimony, DiModica
testified that Officer Smith stood by the squad car while DiModica spoke to Officer
Grimyser through the screen door. DiModica claimed that he did not invite Officer
Grimyser into the house and that Officer Grimyser never asked to enter the home.
According to DiModica, he specifically told Officer Grimyser to stay outside prior to
retrieving his shirt. DiModica also testified that when he returned to the front door,
Officer Grimyser had entered his home without permission.72 On appeal, DiModica
argued that the evidence indicated he directed the officer to wait outside while he
retrieved his shirt. According to DiModica, it would be inherently incredible to
conclude that, after being invited into DiModica's home, officers would allow
691d. at 500.
70See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (establishing that, as a matter of settled
constitutional law, police may not arrest a person in his or her home without an arrest warrant,
absent valid consent or exigent circumstances).
71DiModica, 468 F.3d at 497 (emphasis added).
721d. at 497-98.
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DiModica, who was possibly armed and dangerous, to retrieve a shirt from another
room.
73
The appellate court admitted that "neither [factual] account is completely
logical."74  However, citing the clearly erroneous standard of review, the court
credited the officers' version of events. Incredibly, the court utilized the officers'
admitted deception to justify its findings:
That there were blizzard-like conditions that night in Cottage Grove and
the officers had told DiModica that Anita had been badly injured in an
accident permit the inference that a concerned husband invited the officers
into his house. Because . . . DiModica consented to the officers entering
his residence, DiModica's arrest was legal and did not taint the officers'
subsequent search.75
In challenging his wife's purported consent, DiModica argued that Randolph
controlled because he would have refused to allow the police to search his home had
he not been illegally arrested and removed from the scene.76 The court rejected
DiModica's claim, reasoning that "[u]nlike . . . Randolph, DiModica and his wife
were not standing together at the doorway, one consenting to the search while the
other refused. '77 The court continued:
DiModica fails to distinguish his case from Matlock .... The officers did
not remove DiModica to avoid his objection; they legally arrested
DiModica based on probable cause that he had committed domestic
abuse.78 Once DiModica was arrested and removed from the scene,
Anita's consent alone was valid and permitted the officers to legally
search the residence. 9
DiModica illustrates the difficulty of proving intentional removal. Despite the
arresting officers having been informed that DiModica was likely home, and despite
the officers' admission that they planned to tell DiModica that his wife had been
injured in an automobile accident in order to coerce an invitation into the home, the
court nevertheless ruled that the officers did not "intentionally remove" DiModica to
avoid a Randolph situation. For Seventh Circuit defendants, DiModica has made it
nearly impossible to prove the requisite ill motive sufficient to trigger Randolph's
731d. at 499.
74Id.
75Id Notably, the parties agreed that the officers never asked DiModica for his consent to
search the home, and DiModica never told the officers that they could not search the home.
761d. at 500.
771d.
78Notably, while the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant, probable cause to
arrest does not equate to probable cause to search. But see Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d
1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that an arrest warrant could support the search of a home
when (a) the dwelling is the suspect's home, and (b) police have an objectively reasonable
belief that the suspect "could be found within at the time of entry").
79DiModica, 468 F.3d at 500 (emphasis added).
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admonition against intentional removal. Not surprisingly, in rejecting a similar claim
shortly after DiModica, the Seventh Circuit declared that "Randolph is a narrow
holding, and no matter how hard [a criminal defendant] wiggles-like the stepsisters
trying to squeeze into Cinderella's glass slipper-he can't fit within its embrace. '0
A similar rhetoric was conveyed by a Michigan appeals court in United States v.
Lapworth.81 In that case, in holding that the defendant's "mere invocation" of the
right to remain silent and the right to counsel was insufficient to negate his co-
tenant's consent to entry,"2 the Michigan Court of Appeals reasoned:
Randolph did suggest that where the police purposely remove the suspect
so that the suspect will be unable to object, the cotenant's consent may not
be sufficient. But the Court did not create a blanket rule covering every
situation in which the suspect's absence was attributable to the actions of
the police. Rather, the Court was specifically referring to situations where
the police intentionally removed the suspect for the express purpose of
preventing the suspect from having an opportunity to object.8
.As Lapworth and DiModica illustrate, the actual intent that a defendant must
prove to invoke Randolph is narrow and specific. Not just any intentional removal
will suffice. Further, the proof required to demonstrate this specific intent is difficult
for criminal defendants to obtain.
IV. LAWFULLY AVOIDING OBJECTIONS THROUGH STRATEGIC POLICE ACTION
Realizing that its physical presence requirement might create an incentive for
police to simply choose not to invite a potential objector to take part in the consent
conversation, the Randolph Court cautioned that police may not "remove[] the
potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible
objection."84 On the flip side, the Court stated that police need not "take affirmative
steps to find a potentially objecting co-tenant before acting on the permission they
ha[ve] already received."85 Otherwise, "every co-tenant consent case would turn into
a test about the adequacy of the police's efforts to consult with a potential
objector."86 In combination, these pronouncements indicate that police need not
affirmatively locate a potential objector, but that police also may not impermissibly
remove a potential objector if he happens to be present at the time of the consent
request. The danger for criminal defendants, of course, is the suggestion that police
need not seek out a potential objector.
Matlock and Randolph reveal that when a physically present likely objector has
been removed from the premises prior to a consent request, the case may fall into
"°United States v. Wilburn, 473 F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2007).
81730 N.W.2d 258 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007).
121d. at 259.
831d. at 261 (emphasis added).
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one of three categories that I would describe as "permissible removal,"
"impermissible removal," and the "gray area" in between.
The first category, "permissible removal," encompasses cases such as Matlock
and Parker7 in which the potential objector is lawfully removed from the scene
pursuant to a valid arrest (note that Randolph would have overruled Matlock if such
action were not permissible). The second category, "impermissible removal,"
encompasses cases where police intentionally remove the potential objector "for the
sake of avoiding a possible objection," which Randolph expressly forbids.88 The
final category is the "gray area" in between, encompassing those cases where a
potential objector is not present at the time of a consent request, but the reason for
the defendant's absence is in dispute.
This final category would naturally include both permissible and impermissible
removals,89 and this final category is likely to be home to a great number of
Randolph claims. My review of post-Randolph claims confirms this suspicion.
Included in this gray area are cases in which police simply ignore-rather than
remove-a physically present co-occupant.9 °  Although such evasive action is
arguably unreasonable, post-Randolph courts have generally refused to require
police to actually communicate with all physically present occupants.
A. Police May Lawfully Ignore Physically Present Potential Objectors
To invalidate a warrantless search based on a co-tenant's consent, Randolph
requires the non-consenting tenant to be simultaneously present and objecting.9' In
many cases where the presence requirement is met, police have simply chosen not to
request consent from a physically present likely objector, thereby ensuring no
objection. According to most courts, failing to request consent from a physically
present co-tenant does not equate to the intentional avoidance of a Randolph claim.
This ruling typically holds true, even where searching officers are aware that, or have
reason to believe that, a potential objector is located on the premises at the time of
the request.92
87United States v. Parker, 469 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 2006).
88See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 122.
890n the permissible side, this category would include cases where the defendant is
"absent" from the scene at the time consent is requested and where police would have to
expend more than minimal effort to locate them (note: the Randolph majority has already
stated that such efforts are not required). On the impermissible side, this category would
include cases where the police have, in fact, intentionally removed a likely objector from the
scene to avoid his objection, but the defendant is able to present no evidence to support this
claim.
90See Dery & Hernandez, supra note 23, at 80-82 ("The differing results in Randolph and
Matlock . . . send a strong signal to police-should you wish to enter a home without a
warrant, isolate the most likely potential objector so that you may ask permission from those
more willing to allow entry. The logical extension of such reasoning would suggest an
unspoken 'Don't Ask So the Suspect Won't Tell' training policy in order to direct officers to
the safe side of the Court's fine line.").
9 1See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121.
92See, e.g., Donald v. State, 903 A.2d 315, 321 (Del. 2006) (ruling that "police are not
required to take affirmative steps to seek consent from a potentially objecting co-tenant, even
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In Casteel v. State,93 for example, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the consent
of an off-premises co-tenant despite the fact that defendant was located on the
premises at the time of the search. 94 In Casteel, the defendant had sexually abused
his live-in girlfriend's daughter. When the daughter's mother learned of the abuse,
she contacted the police and provided written consent to search the defendant's
property. Upon arrival at Casteel's property, the detectives knocked on the door
several times. Receiving no response, they entered the apartment using a key
provided by the mother. Once inside, the officers encountered Casteel in the home.
The officers then detained Casteel and transported him to a secure location for
questioning. The officers apparently did not inform Casteel of their intent to conduct
a warrantless search of his residence.95
Over the next two hours, while Casteel was interrogated off premises, several
officers stayed behind and searched his apartment. The searching officers found oils,
lubricants, and panties in a bag belonging to Casteel. Unable to locate sexually
graphic photographs described by the victim, one of the officers drove to the site of
detention and asked Casteel where the photographs could be found. When Casteel
informed the officer of their location, rather than requesting Casteel's consent to
conduct the additional search, the officer called the victim's mother for her further
consent. The mother consented to the additional search, and the officer subsequently
located the photos.96
Prior to trial, Casteel moved to suppress the items found during both searches.
The court denied the motion. On appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court, Casteel
argued that the search of his apartment was unlawful because the officers did not
explicitly seek his consent even though he was readily available during both
searches.97 The court rejected this argument, reasoning that, unlike Randolph,
Casteel never expressly or impliedly protested the search.98
According to the logic of Casteel, as long as a resident who is present at the time
of the search does not actually object, the joint resident's consent does not implicate
Randolph.99 Thus, in future cases, police who confront a physically present suspect
when present") (emphasis added). See also People v. Gil, No. B185496, 2006 WL 2831022,
at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2006) (unreported). The California Court of Appeal held that "it is
not enough that [a physically present] defendant could have objected prior to entry by the
police." Rather, "[t]he defendant must actually be at the door and expressly object for a
cotenant's consent to be invalid as to the defendant." Id. (emphasis added).
9"131 P.3d 1 (Nev. 2006).
94Id. at 2.




99See id. at 4 ("Absent an objection by a resident present at the time of the search, a joint
resident should most certainly be able to consent to a search of the residence to investigate and
terminate the commission of ongoing criminal misconduct at or on the property").
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may reduce the likelihood of an express objection by simply not announcing their
intent to search.1°°
The Indiana Court of Appeals employed a similar logic in Starks v. State.'l ' In
Starks, Officer Bragg of the Indianapolis Police Department was notified that a black
male was selling drugs out of an Indianapolis home."0 2 Later that evening, a second
individual confirmed this report and informed Officer Bragg that her grandmother,
Hazel Civils, owned the home. 103 She also reported seeing a makeshift door in the
home with a sign warning others to "stay out."
Based on this information, Officer Bragg and two other officers went to the
home. Civils' grandson, Edward, answered the door and ushered the officers inside.
Edward escorted Officer Patton to Civils' bedroom. While Officer Patton was
speaking with Civils, Officers McPherson and Bragg noticed the basement entrance
was blocked by a piece of plywood containing the words "stay out."
Without verifying whether they had consent to search, the officers moved the
plywood and went down to the basement. In the basement, the officers saw Starks
sitting on a couch and observed a gun underneath the couch. Officer McPherson
then placed Starks in handcuffs. Most significantly, during the time Officers
McPherson and Bragg were in the basement, Officer Patton asked Civils for
permission to search the house for evidence of illegal activity."°  After Starks had
been detained, Officer Patton entered the basement and notified McPherson and
100Similar to Casteel, United States v. McCurdy, 480 F. Supp. 2d 380 (D. Maine 2007),
authorizes police to arrest a defendant and simply not ask for his consent before attempting to
conduct a search of defendant's jointly-occupied property. In McCurdy, the defendant's
live-in girlfriend, Ms. Sawtelle, reported a domestic assault and notified police that the
defendant had illegal weapons inside the residence. As Deputy Rolfe was on his way to the
home, he was notified that the defendant had been detained in a nearby town. Id. Deputy
Rolfe went to speak with McCurdy before heading to the home. Id. Despite his intention to
proceed directly to the McCurdy home, Deputy Rolfe did not notify McCurdy of his intent to
search the residence. See id. at 383 (indicating that Deputy Rolfe notified McCurdy that he
was going to continue to McCurdy's residence to complete his investigation; however, he did
not request McCurdy's permission to search). Upon Deputy Rolfe's arrival, Ms. Sawtelle
consented to a search. Id.
Officers then discovered evidence used to convict McCurdy. Id. The district court later
rejected McCurdy's Randolph argument, reasoning that "Randolph has little application here,
since Mr. McCurdy was not present at the scene to expressly refuse consent to search the
[home]." Id. at 390 n.9. The court declared:
Mr. McCurdy [argues] that Randolph controls because he was in police custody and
Deputy Rolfe could have contacted him to obtain his consent .... [T]he court cannot
agree with the Defendant .... There is no indication Randolph would extend to
absent, but potentially reachable defendants who, if reached, might refuse consent.
Id
101846 N.E.2d 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
'°21d. at 676.
10 3See id.
l°4Notably, Officer Patton did not testify to what Civils' answer was to this question, and
at her deposition, Civils stated that she remembered the police coming to her home but could
not remember the details of their visit. See id. at 677.
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Bragg that they had permission to search the residence. At trial, the following
exchange took place between Officer Patton and Starks' attorney:
Q: So you did not get consent to search until after you had talked to Miss
Civils?
A: Correct.
Q: And the officers were downstairs in the basement prior to you
receiving consent from Miss Hazel Civils to search the home?
A: Yes." 5
In an ensuing warrantless search of the basement, the officers found cocaine
under the basement couch. Starks later moved to suppress this evidence.' The trial
court denied the motion. 10 7 Employing a deferential standard of review,0 8 the
appellate court affirmed. In distinguishing Randolph, the appellate court declared:
[A]t the time Civils consented to a search of the residence, Starks was not
physically present in Civils' bedroom nor did he express his refusal to
consent to the search. Starks was physically present when Officers
McPherson and Bragg entered the basement..., but there is no indication
in the record that he expressed a refusal to consent to the officers' later
search of that area. Therefore, Randolph is distinguishable and the
officers' search of the basement ... was permissible." 9
Despite the physical presence of the defendant at the time of the warrantless
search, and despite the searching officers' lack of consent to enter the basement at
the time they first encountered the defendant, the court upheld the search due to
Starks' failure to object. Had the defendant simply shouted "get out" as the officers
entered the basement, the court presumably would have reached the opposite result,
as the two Randolph requirements-physical presence and express objection-would
have been simultaneously triggered.
'
5Id. at 680.
106Notably, at the hearing on Starks' motion, Edward testified that he heard knocking on
the door and that when he went to answer the door, the officers were already inside the house.
However, Officer Patton contested Edward's testimony. Id.
l°71d at 678.
'
08The court declared that in reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, the court does not
reweigh the evidence, and only considers conflicting evidence that is most favorable to the
trial court's ruling. The appellate court also may consider any uncontested evidence favorable
to the defendant. See id.
1°9M. at 682 n. I (emphasis added).
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B. Police May Plan a Consent Request for a Time When the Potential Objector Will
Not Be Home
As indicated, one likely effect of Randolph is to encourage police to circumvent
its holding by removing a potential objector from the scene" 0 (so long as the police
do not leave evidence of ill intent in their wake). Despite the police-friendly harbor
offered by Matlock, where a likely objector is present on the premises at the time the
police seek consent, there remains a possibility the suspect will come to the door and
object. Effectively removing this possibility and further limiting Randolph's reach,
courts have authorized police to plan their consent request for a time when they
know the potential objector will not be home."'
In Commonwealth v. Yancoskie," 12 a Pennsylvania state court upheld the consent
of a defendant's wife even though officers admitted to planning their consent request
for a time when they knew defendant was out of town on a fishing trip."3 On appeal
from the denial of his motion to suppress, the defendant argued that by purposely
timing their search to coincide with his fishing trip, the police in effect "removed"
him "from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible rejection.'' 4 The court
disagreed, reasoning that by "voluntarily absenting himself from the house," the
defendant assumed the risk that his wife would allow the police to conduct a
search." The court relied upon the following Randolph passage:
[W]e think it would needlessly limit the capacity of the police to respond
to ostensibly legitimate opportunities in the field if we were to hold that
reasonableness required the police to take affirmative steps to find a
potentially objecting co-tenant before acting on the permission they had
already received .... [Otherwise] every co-tenant consent case would
"
0Various commentators predicted this result. See, e.g., Andrew Fiske, Comments,
Disputed-Consent Searches: An Uncharacteristic Step Toward Reinforcing Defendants'
Privacy Rights, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 721, 735-36 (2006) (arguing that, by refusing to overrule
Matlock, Randolph creates an incentive for police to detain and remove any co-occupant likely
to refuse consent); Wineholt, supra note 30, at 497-98 (arguing that "[a]lthough the Randolph
Court indicated that its decision does not permit law enforcement officers to remove a
defendant from the doorway to prevent his or her objection to a search, its decision will likely
do the opposite").
"'Commentators predicted this result as well. See, e.g., C. Dan Black, Georgia v.
Randolph: A Murky Refinement of the Fourth Amendment Third-Party Consent Doctrine, 42
GONZ. L. REV. 321, 333 (2007) (arguing that Randolph "too easily [] allows law enforcement
to bend the circumstances to their advantage by waiting for a potential objecting occupant to
leave before securing a co-occupant's consent"). See also Georgia v. Randolph, 547 US. 103,
141-42 (2006) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
112915 A.2d 111 (Penn. Super. Ct. 2006).
"
31d. at 115. In its opinion, the Yancoskie court noted that "the record supports
Appellant's assertion that the agents timed their request for Wife's consent to search the house
with a time when they knew Appellant was to be out of town." Id.
14Id. (quoting Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121).
1151d.
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turn into a test about the adequacy of the police's efforts to consult with a
potential objector."6
Taking the Yancoskie reasoning one step further, at least one court has allowed
police who were initially confronted with an express refusal to return to the premises
at a time when they knew the original objector would not be home. In an
unpublished opinion, United States v. Groves,"7 the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana rejected the Randolph claim of a defendant who was
physically present on the searched premises and adamantly denied law
enforcement's initial request to search.
In Groves, on July 5, 2004, South Bend police officers received a report that
someone was shooting at a home on St. Joseph Street." 8 Upon their arrival, officers
interviewed Groves, a resident of the home from which the shots were allegedly
fired. Groves proclaimed his innocence, denied Officer Taylor's request to search
his apartment, and asked the officer to obtain a search warrant. Officer Taylor later
testified that Groves was "adamant that we could not go in the apartment."" 9 Shortly
thereafter, the officers applied for a warrant to search Groves' apartment, but the
judge denied the application.' °
Sixteen days after the initial visit, a different group of officers returned to
Groves' apartment. The officers knocked on Groves' door and encountered his
girlfriend, Shaunta Foster. When Agent Battani asked for Foster's consent to search
the apartment, Foster stated that she would like to speak to Groves. Agent Battani
then told Foster that the consent was not between himself and Groves but rather
between himself and Foster. Agent Battani then obtained Foster's consent and
subsequently recovered two 20-gauge shotgun shells and five rounds of
ammunition.121
In rejecting Groves' motion to suppress, the court first found that Foster had
actual authority over the premises. 22 Because Foster exercised common authority
over the apartment, as in Yancoskie, the court held that Groves "assumed the risk"
that she might permit access to the apartment. Rejecting Groves' Randolph claim,
the court declared:
Groves was not physically present at the apartment when the agents
obtained the consent of his live-in girlfriend.... When asked on July 5,
2004 whether the officers could search his apartment, Groves told the
officers "no" and that they could obtain a search warrant. This Court
116 d. (quoting Randolph, 547 U.S. at 122) (emphasis added).
"




122See id. at *4-*5 (reasoning that the telephone at Groves' apartment was registered in
Foster's name and was paid by Foster, that Foster's daughter was registered for school using
the Groves' address, that Foster kept various personal belongings at this residence, and that
she regularly cleaned the apartment).
20081
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While it is true that the officers knew that Groves worked during the day
and would likely not be home at 1:30 p.m., the officers did not take any
affirmative steps to remove Groves from the premises prior to
approaching Foster. Groves simply was not home when the officers
returned to his house, and even though the officers knew that Groves
would likely not be home at that time, they did not procure his absence to
avoid his objection.'24
The rationale underlying Groves is that it is constitutionally reasonable for law
enforcement to circumvent a defendant's express refusal of consent, and their
subsequent failure to obtain a search warrant, by returning to the premises at a time
when the defendant is no longer home.'25 Because the officers in Groves had more
than ample time to obtain a search warrant yet failed to do so, this case purports to
legitimize a warrantless search over the defendant's prior express objection where
probable cause is lacking. Yet, this ruling seemingly complies with a strict
construction of Randolph, which requires physical presence at the time of the
consent request and a simultaneous objection to such consent.
V. DIFFICULTIES IN PROVING AN EXPRESS OBJECTION
A. Police Win Most "He Said, She Said" Battles
As the above discussion indicates, when defendants seek to employ Randolph's
rule against purposeful removal, courts are extremely reluctant to explore a police
officer's intent in removing a defendant prior to requesting consent. This is
somewhat expected, as courts are generally reluctant to scrutinize the subjective
motivations of police.'26 But even in cases not involving inquiries into police intent,
defendants seeking Randolph's protections have encountered similar problems of




125But see United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954, 964 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Melloy,
J., dissenting) (arguing that such police practices are, in fact, unreasonable because
Randolph 's desire to eliminate the need for a "dragnet" to find "potential objectors" does not
apply in the case of a previously disputed consent).
126See, e.g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 319 (1994) (holding that in determining
whether a subject is "in custody," courts are not to consider an "officer's subjective and
undisclosed view concerning whether the person being interrogated is a suspect"); Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990) ("Evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the
application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the
subjective state of mind of the officer."); See Berkermer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984)
(holding that a traffic stop of the defendant for suspicion of driving under the influence of an
intoxicating substance did not render him "in custody" despite the trooper's uncommunicated
intent to arrest the defendant upon completion of the trooper's field sobriety examination).
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actual disputed consent have experienced significant difficulties in proving their
claims. This is because courts typically side with the police where a defendant's
claim to have refused consent is directly disputed by the searching officers.'27
United States v. Wilson"2 8 is illustrative. In Wilson, two officers were dispatched
to an Omaha residence in response to a burglary report. When the first officer
arrived, Officer Smith spoke with the owner of the residence, Sandra Wilson, and
one of her sons, Bart Wilson, who each indicated that jewelry and a firearm were
missing. Bart Wilson's girlfriend was also present during this exchange. Sandra and
Bart Wilson each told Officer Smith that they had seen the missing firearm in a
drawer in the defendant's room, who lived in the basement of the residence. Shortly
thereafter, the defendant arrived at the residence.
At the suppression hearing, Officer Smith testified that at this point, he told the
defendant to sit down while he went to the basement to search for the firearm. Both
Officer Smith and Officer Reynolds testified that the defendant did not object when
Officer Smith stated his intent to retrieve the firearm from the basement.'29
However, two of the defendant's witnesses, Sandra Wilson and Bart Wilson's
girlfriend, testified that when Officer Smith stated his intent to search defendant's
basement room, defendant objected. 30
In rejecting defendant's motion to suppress, the magistrate judge made the
outcome-determinative finding that the defendant did not, in fact, object to Officer
Smith going downstairs to search. 3' In affirming, the appellate court also concluded
that the defendant did not object to the search.' 32 The court thus ruled that, because
of its "credibility findings," Randolph "is not applicable despite defendant's
assertion."133
Wilson represents the typical situation. In most cases involving a dispute
regarding the details of an exchange between law enforcement and a criminal
defendant, the court generally sides with the police.'34 A notable exception is United
States v. Henderson.'35
While not a reported decision, Henderson is a significant case, as it exemplifies
the type of evidence a criminal defendant must present to win a credibility battle
with the police. In Henderson, Chicago police responded to a domestic dispute
127See generally Strauss, supra note 8.
128No. 8:06CR145, 2006 WL 3253477 (D. Neb. Nov. 8, 2006).
1'Id. at *2.
13 Old
13 1d. at *3.
132Id at *4.
13 31d.
134See also United States v. McKerrell, 491 F.3d 1221, 1223-24 (10th Cir. 2007)
(upholding district court's factual finding that defendant did not actually object to consent
search by crediting the testimony of various officers directly contradicting defendant's
testimony that he expressly informed the police several times that he did not want them inside
his home).
13No. 04 CR 697, 2006 WL 3469538 (N.D. I11. Nov. 29, 2006) (unreported).
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between Mr. and Mrs. Henderson. When officers arrived at the home, the wife,
Patricia Henderson, was standing outside with a noticeable injury. She told the
officers that defendant had choked her, and that he threw her out of the house when
she called 9-1-1. Patricia gave the officers a key to the home, stating that her
husband had weapons in the house and a history of arrests.
The police entered the front door and encountered Mr. Henderson in the living
room. At this point, Mr. Henderson claimed to have responded by ordering the
police to leave.'36 Rather than complying, the police arrested Mr. Henderson and
transferred him to the police station. Officers then searched the home and
discovered evidence used to indict Henderson of crimes unrelated to the domestic
dispute.'37
Invoking Randolph, Henderson moved to suppress the evidence. At the
suppression hearing, more than one officer testified that Henderson did not order the
officers to leave (or that they did not recall the defendant making such a
statement).' The trial court, however, found otherwise. The court declared:
There is some controversy about whether defendant made this statement
to the officers. The notes prepared by the United States Attorney
prosecuting this case reflect that one or more of the arresting officers
confirmed that defendant told them to "[leave] my house." At the
suppression hearing, however, the officers testified [to the contrary].
Based on the candid and professional representation of the prosecutor, the
court finds that defendant in fact made the statement.1 39
Finding that defendant did in fact refuse permission to search the home, the court
deemed the subsequent search unreasonable.'40
The above passage suggests that the officers changed their story in order to avoid
the protections of Randolph, a practice which commentators have argued is more
common in Fourth Amendment cases than one might expect. 4' Further, the court's
account of its receipt of this evidence suggests that, had the prosecutor not come
forward with his notes on the case, the defendant would have been unable to rebut
the officers' contradictory testimony.
131d. at *1 n.2.
137Henderson was charged with the federal offenses of possessing with intent to distribute
narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and with being a felon in possession of
weapons, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 922, and 26 U.S.C. § 586(d). Henderson,
2006 WL 3469538, at *1.
"'Id. at *1 n.2.
1391d. (emphasis added).
14°/d. at *2.
14'See Strauss, supra note 8, at 246 ("The extent of police perjury in consent cases is ...
unquantifiable. 'By their very nature, successful lies remain undetected.' But anecdotal
evidence and some empirical studies document that police perjury is a serious problem. One
former Police Chief candidly admitted his belief that most 'testilying' occurs at suppression
hearings with respect to consent searches .... Professor Dripps, after surveying the available
studies, concurred: 'The available evidence strongly indicates that police perjury is a
widespread phenomenon."') (citing Donald A. Dripps, Police, Plus Perjury, Equals
Polygraphy, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 693, 693-94 (1996)).
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It goes without saying that it is the rare case that a prosecutor provides the court
with evidence that his partner in law enforcement has lied under oath. This is
particularly true where the evidence would have the effect of exonerating the
defendant, as in Henderson.'42 Thus, Henderson represents the rare exception where
a criminal defendant claims victory on the "he said, she said" Randolph
battleground.143
B. Even a Proven Consent Refusal Must Be Unequivocal, Precise, and Definite
Even in cases where a defendant proves he actually refused consent, courts have
held that the refusal must be sufficiently unequivocal, precise, and definite for
Randolph to apply.
1. Rejection Must Be Unequivocal
In rejecting a Randolph claim, the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas
declared that the following objection of a physically-present defendant would be too
equivocal to satisfy Randolph: "You cannot go in there. It's not my home, but no
[o]ne gave you permission. It belongs to my mother."'" The court declared:
[T]his objection is significantly different than the objection made by the
co-tenant in Georgia v. Randolph who "unequivocally refused" the
officer's request to search. Here, defendant was not asked for consent and
arguably did not state a personal objection, but instead merely voiced
his... belief that his mother had not consented.145
A similar logic was expressed in United States v. Reed.' In Reed, Officer
Severns of the South Bend Police Department stopped and arrested the defendant
after he observed the defendant run a stop light. Officer Severns immediately
recognized Reed from his prior controlled purchases of cocaine conducted at Reed's
residence, 4009 Bonfield. During an ensuing taped conversation, Officer Sevems
asked Reed whether he lived at 4009 Bonfield, to which Reed replied, "Yeah, I've
been there (inaudible).' 47 Later in the interview, the following exchange took place:
142This is also particularly rare where the evidence comes in the form of an attorney's
personal notes, which are generally considered privileged and confidential under the work
product doctrine. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. 5 (2007). See also FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) ("Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents and tangible things that
are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative
(including the other party's attorney .... ").
143See also People v. Mikrut, 864 N.E.2d 958 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (upholding trial court's
factual finding that defendant did, in fact, object to the officers entering his home without a
warrant even though testimony of officers and defendant were contradictory).
'"United States v. Murphy, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1192-93 (D. Kan. 2006). Although the
court ultimately discredited the defendant's testimony and found that he did not actually make
the above statement, the court declared that, even assuming the defendant actually did make
this particular statement, the statement would be too equivocal to trigger the Randolph rule.
See id. at 1193.
1451d
'46No. 3:06-CR-75 RM, 2006 WL 2252515, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 3, 2006) (unreported).
147Id. at *1.
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Severns: Ok. You willing to sign a permit to search, go back over there
to your place over on Bonfield so we can double check to make sure
there's no more stuff there.
Terry Reed: Naw that's not my place, I can't give you permission for
that. '48
At some point during this conversation, Johanna Foster had driven to a nearby
parking lot to observe. Officer Severns, who knew Foster to be Reed's girlfriend,
spoke with Foster, who stated that she lived with Reed at 4009 Bonfield. Officer
Severns then requested and obtained Foster's consent to search.
1 49
At the Bonfield residence, officers found evidence used to indict Reed. Reed
moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that Foster's consent was insufficient in
light of his own refusal to consent. 5 ° In rejecting the Randolph claim, the court
reasoned:
Mr. Reed didn't object to the search in the sense meant by the Randolph
Court. Mr. Reed did not object to officers searching the residence; he did
not forbid their entry. He declined to consent because (he claimed,
falsely) "that's not my place, I can't give you permission for that." The
officers' belief and later confirmation that it was his place didn't change
the nature of Mr. Reed's reply. There often is no difference between a
speaker telling callers that they can't come in and a speaker telling callers
that he can't let them in. Under Randolph, though, there is a difference. 5 '
Cases such as Reed and Murphy indicate that Randolph will not apply unless a
criminal defendant denies a consent request directly and unequivocally.
2. Rejection Must Be Precise and Definite
In United States v. Marasco,5 2 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals further
limited Randolph by permitting officers to search a hotel room shared by co-
defendants over the express objection of one of the physically present defendants. In
a ruling which directly contradicts key language in Randolph, the court reasoned that
because one defendant consented to a search of the entire hotel room while the
objecting tenant only explicitly rejected consent to search her "stuff," officers could





1511d. at *5. The court also reasoned that Randolph requires the objector to be physically
present "at the door" when his objection is made, and Reed was not. Id.
152446 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (D. Neb. 2006), affd in pertinent part, 487 F.3d 543 (8th Cir.
2007).
153The court ultimately ruled that any evidence found in the hotel room that was not
obviously a part of the second defendant's "stuff' was admissible against both defendants.
See id. at 1085, 1098 (magistrate's report and recommendation).
[Vol. 56:663
HeinOnline  -- 56 Clev. St. L. Rev.  688 2008
27
McAllister: What the High Court giveth the Lower Courts taketh Away: How to P
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
WHAT THE HIGH COURT GIVETH
In Marasco, officers observed a male and female entering a hotel room believed
to be the site of drug activity. Officers identified the male as defendant Marasco,
who was subject to an outstanding felony warrant.'54 The female was later identified
as co-defendant Angela Harms. The officers knocked on the motel room door and
Marasco answered. The officers immediately arrested and handcuffed Marasco. An
officer then asked Harms to step outside, which she did. Harms told the officer that
both her and Marasco shared the room equally. When the officer asked Harms for
permission to search the room, she answered that she would "rather not" have the
officers looking through "her stuff."'55 Harms did not explicitly consent to the
search of the rest of the room.'56
After this exchange with Harms, a different officer asked Marasco for permission
to search the room. Curiously, the officer stated that Marasco did not actually need
to consent. 57 Marasco consented.
Despite Harms' failure to consent just moments before, the officers searched the
entire room and seized items relating to methamphetamine production.' Both
defendants were subsequently charged with methamphetamine-related offenses, and
both filed motions to suppress the evidence obtained from the hotel room.
With respect to the charges brought against Marasco, in his report and
recommendation, Magistrate Judge Thalken determined that Randolph permitted the
introduction of all evidence obtained from the hotel room against Marasco. Judge
Thalken reasoned that the protections of Randolph only extend to the person who
actually objects to the search. To support the ruling, Judge Thalken quoted the
passage from Randolph which declares that "a physically present co-occupant's
stated refusal to permit entry prevails, rendering the warrantless search unreasonable
and invalid as to him."'159
According to the Magistrate Judge, because a warrantless search would only be
unlawful "as to" the objecting co-occupant, the very same search conducted in the
face of an objection is nonetheless reasonable "as against" the non-objecting co-
occupant.
As to the non-objecting co-occupant who is later charged with a criminal offense,
this reasoning would significantly reduce the scope of Randolph's protections, as it
in effect allows the police to completely disregard a physically present co-occupant's
express refusal and simply proceed forward with their intended search. This ruling
flies in the face of the most reasonable interpretation of Randolph, which requires the
police to obtain a warrant in the event of an express refusal of consent by a
physically present co-occupant.
Several lower courts have, in fact, declared this to be the effect of Randolph's
rule. The Wyoming Supreme Court, for example, has declared that "[s]o long as the
Randolph decision represents the law of the land, the police must honor the denial of
Id. at 1077.
'See id. at 1077, 1098.
56See id. at 1098.
'Id. at 1077.
"'Id. at 1078.
1591d at 1097 (citing Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006)) (emphasis added).
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consent to search, by a cotenant who is present and protests the search. Another
cotenant may not override that refusal with his/her consent. '""6  Similarly, the
Delaware Supreme Court summarized the effect of Randolph as "requiring ... that
officers stop a warrantless search based upon the consent of a co-occupant when
another co-occupant of the home expressly objects to the search."''
Likewise, in Randolph itself, the Supreme Court declared that "disputed
invitation, without more, gives a police officer no better claim to reasonableness in
entering than the officer would have in the absence of any consent at all."' 62 Each of
the above interpretations directly contradicts the Marasco ruling, which allows
officers to enter the premises to conduct a warrantless search even when a physically
present co-occupant explicitly objects.
The Marasco court did not stop there. After finding the entire search valid as to
Marasco, the Magistrate Judge then analyzed whether the search was valid as to
Harms. Invoking the precise wording of Harms's refusal of consent-"I would
rather not have you looking through my stuff'-the Magistrate Judge found that only
the items that were located among items that were clearly a part of "Harms' stuff'
were inadmissible. In particular, only the items seized from Harms' purse would be
inadmissible against her, as Harms's purse and "some craft items" were the only
items in the room readily apparent to the officers to belong to Harms. 163 All
remaining items recovered from the hotel room were deemed admissible against both
Harms and Marasco.'" Upon review, the district court adopted the Magistrate
Judge's conclusions, 65 and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed."6
VI. THE RANDOLPH EXPANSIVE OUTLIERS: HUDsPETH AND SNOW
Few courts have explicitly extended the Randolph rule. My research uncovered
just two that did so through principled reasoning-the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals 167 and the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas.16  The Eighth Circuit's
opinion, however, was vacated and reversed by the full court on en banc review.169
160McClelland v. State, 155 P.3d 1013, 1019 (Wyo. 2007).
16'Donald v. State, 903 A.2d 315, 321 (Del. 2006).
162Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 114 (2006) (emphasis added).
163Marasco, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1098.
164Id
165See id. at 1084-85.
166See United States v. Marasco, 487 F.3d 543, 547-48 (2007) (affirming that only the
items found in Harms's "stuff," which included only her purse, were inadmissible as to
Harms).
167United States v. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2006), rehearing en banc granted and
opinion vacated Jan 4, 2007.
168See Commonwealth v. Snow, 80 Pa. D. & C.4th 262 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. 2006) (extending
Randolph's protection to invalidate a search where the defendant came out of the shower and
objected to a search that had already been underway pursuant to his wife's consent).
169See United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
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In United States v. Hudspeth,7 ' a three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals invalidated the consent of defendant's wife where the defendant, just prior
to being arrested at his place of business and not long before his wife's consent, had
refused consent to search their shared home.' 7' In July 2002, seeking to uncover
evidence of excessive sales of ephedrine tablets, officers executed a search warrant at
a business owned by defendant Roy Hudspeth.1 2  During the search, police
discovered evidence of child pornography on a compact disk located on Hudspeth's
desk. Believing additional evidence might be found at Hudspeth's home, officers
sought Mr. Hudspeth's permission to search his home. Hudspeth rejected the
request. Hudspeth was then placed under arrest and transported to the county jail.'73
Four officers then proceeded to the defendant's home. Officers informed Mrs.
Hudspeth they had arrested her husband and indicated the home computer might
contain contraband. The officers, however, did not tell Mrs. Hudspeth that her
husband objected to the search.'74 After attempting unsuccessfully to contact her
attorney, Mrs. Hudspeth consented to the search. Officers then seized additional
evidence used to indict Hudspeth.'
The trial court denied Hudspeth's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from
his home, and he was convicted and sentenced to sixty months of imprisonment.'76
Hudspeth appealed. Invoking Randolph, Hudspeth argued that he expressly denied
consent, and that his wife's subsequent consent could not "overrule" his denial.'77
The three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit agreed,'78 reasoning:
[T]he same constitutional principles underlying the Supreme Court's
concerns in Randolph apply regardless of whether the non-consenting co-
tenant is physically present at the residence, outside the residence in a car,
or, as in our case, off-site at his place of employment. Unlike in Matlock
or in the hypothetical situation discussed in Randolph in which a
170459 F.3d 922, rehearing en banc granted and opinion vacated Jan 4, 2007.
...Id. at 930.
172See id. at 928.
173 id. at 925.
174Citing Matlock and Rodriguez, the en banc court later clarified that "the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness requirement did not demand that the officers inform Mrs.
Hudspeth of her husband's refusal." Hudspeth, 518 F.3d at 960.
175Hudspeth, 459 F.3d at 926. Hudspeth was indicted on one count of possession of child
pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5) and (b)(2), and on one count of
producing and attempting to produce child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)
and (d). Hudspeth, 459 F.3d at 926.
176After the district court denied Hudspeth's motion to suppress the evidence obtained
from his home, Hudspeth pled guilty to the charges and reserved the right to appeal the denial
of his motion. 1d.
'
77See id. at 928.
178See id. at 929-31. The court, however, ultimately remanded the case back to the district
court for a determination of whether there were alternative grounds for the admission of the
photos stored on the home computer, such as and including inevitable discovery. Id. at 93 1.
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"potential objector, nearby but not invited to take part in the threshold
colloquy, loses out," here Hudspeth was invited to participate and
expressly denied his consent to search. [citing Randolph, 126 S.Ct. at
1527]. Thus, Mrs. Hudspeth's "disputed invitation, without more, [gave
the] police officer no better claim to reasonableness in entering than the
officer would have in the absence of any consent at all." [citing
Randolph, 126 S.Ct. at 1523]." 79
The court thus concluded "that the police must get a warrant when one co-occupant
denies consent to search.""18
In 2006, the full court reconsidered Hudspeth en banc,' 8' and in March 2008, the
court issued an opinion endorsing the government's view of Randolph.8 2 Judge
Riley, who authored the panel's dissent, reasoned that Randolph required both
"physical presence" combined with an "immediate objection.' 18 3  Judge Riley
declared that "unlike Randolph .... when [the officers] asked for Mrs. Hudspeth's
consent, Hudspeth was not present because he had been lawfully arrested .... Thus,
... the narrow holding of Randolph, which repeatedly referenced the defendant's
physical presence and immediate objection, is inapplicable here."' 84
Although the original panel opinion has been vacated, both sets of opinions are
significant for suggesting two possible interpretations of Randolph-what I will
designate "the constructive presence" interpretation and the "Randolph bright-line
rule." The "Randolph bright-line rule" requires physical presence without exception.
Under this view, the wishes of any person not physically located at the premises are
irrelevant, even if that person has already expressly voiced his wishes. The theory
underlying this approach is assumption of risk and is best elaborated in leading third
party consent cases such as Matlock'85 and Frazier v. Cupp.
18 6
Under the alternative "constructive presence" interpretation, police must obtain a
search warrant when a co-occupant who is physically incapable of confronting the
police at the searched premises expressly denies consent to search. The theory
behind this interpretation is that police act "unreasonably"' 87 when, after receiving an
'




18 'd at 922.
182United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
"'Id. at 959.
1'41d. at 960.
185The Matlock Court justified its ruling on the assumption of risk doctrine, declaring that
"it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the
inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number
might permit the common area to be searched." United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172
n.7 (1990).
16394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (upholding warrantless consent search of shared duffle bag
under the assumption of risk theory).
187See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990) (declaring that the Fourth
Amendment does not require the agents "always be correct, but that they always be
reasonable").
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unequivocal refusal of consent by a co-tenant physically incapable of objecting at the
residence, police proceed to the residence to pursue consent from another
occupant.' 8  This interpretation is grounded both in the reasonableness standards
embodied in the Fourth Amendment 89 and in the notion that Fourth Amendment
protections are personal such that a co-tenant cannot "waive" another individual's
expressed Fourth Amendment wishes. 9 '
While theoretically significant, the approach of the three-judge panel in Hudspeth
is easily attacked. The "Randolph bright-line rule" is grounded in the assumption of
risk doctrine, and since the late 1960s, this doctrine has carried the day in Fourth
Amendment consent jurisprudence.' 9' As noted above, 192 most recent case law
solidifies this shift away from the individual rights doctrine toward the assumption of
risk approach.
Further, most post-Randolph courts have recognized the centrality of Randolph's
physical presence requirement. In United States v. Reed,' for example, a case with
nearly identical facts as Hudspeth,'94 the court flatly rejected the defendant's
188But see United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954, 961 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(citations omitted):
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit warrantless searches and seizures, nor does
the Fourth Amendment always prohibit warrantless searches and seizures when the
defendant previously objected to the search and seizure. "What ... is assured by the
Fourth Amendment itself, however, is . . . no such search will occur that is
'unreasonable.' As the Supreme Court explains, "it is reasonable to recognize that
any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his [or her] own
right." And the absent, expressly objecting co-inhabitant has "assumed the risk" that
another co-inhabitant "might permit the common area to be searched."
Id.
'
t 9See id. at 961-62 (Melloy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the search that occurred in
Hudspeth was "unreasonable," and therefore invalid).
19t At oral argument on the en banc rehearing, Hudspeth argued that Randolph's "physical
presence" requirement is satisfied (i.e., "is of no constitutional significance") where the person
whom the evidence is being used against has refused consent to search, even where such
refusal occurs away from the property. Hudspeth supported this argument by noting that in
Randolph, the Court reasoned that "there is no common understanding that one co-tenant has
the right to prevail over the express wishes of another." See United States v. Hudspeth, Eighth
Circuit Oral Argument Database, No. 05-3316, at 13:20-15:20 (May 11, 2007),
http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/oralargs/oaFrame.html (follow "case number" hyperlink on left-
hand menu; input case number in search box; follow search button; click on hyperlink that
refers to case date).
191See Frazier, 394 U.S. at 740 (upholding warrantless consent search of shared duffle bag
under the assumption of risk theory). See also McCall, supra note 22, at 592.
192See supra discussion Part IV.B. (noting Yancoskie and Groves as recent examples).
'
93No. 3:06-CR-75 RM, 2006 WL 2252515 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 3, 2006).
194See id. at *5. In Reed, the defendant refused consent to search his home while detained
at the police station. The officers, however, then proceeded to Reed's home and obtained the
consent of Reed's co-occupant. Id.
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argument that Randolph applied, reasoning that Randolph's physical presence
requirement is too integral to be ignored.'95
Judge Riley advanced a similar view in each of his Hudspeth opinions. 96
According to Judge Riley, if the Randolph Court had desired to adopt the broader
rule espoused by the defendant, the Court would not have continuously used the
phrase "physically present."' 97 Instead, the Court would have invalidated police
entry without a warrant whenever the suspect refuses consent to search his residence,
regardless of the suspect's precise location at the time of refusal.'9 " According to
Judge Riley, the panel's interpretation "makes the 'physically present and objecting'
language in Randolph mere surplusage."'' 99
In the only other published opinion explicitly extending Randolph, the
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas extended Randolph to invalidate a search
where the defendant, while showering, objected to a search already underway
pursuant to his wife's consent.
In Commonwealth v. Snow,2 °° police responded to a complaint from the
defendant's wife that the defendant had been drinking. She stated that she was on
her way home, as was defendant Snow. Two police officers arrived at the Snow
residence at the same time as defendant and his wife, who arrived in separate
vehicles. The officers spoke with Snow's wife in the front yard while Snow went
directly into the house. The officers then obtained permission from Mrs. Snow to
enter the house. Mrs. Snow opened the front door and led the police into the
home."' Once inside, the officers reached a closed bathroom door, where the
defendant was showering. Defendant unequivocally voiced his objection to their
warrantless presence and ordered the officers to leave.2"2 The officers responded by
ordering the defendant to come out of the bathroom and threatening the defendant
with serious bodily injury if he refused.20 3 Upon Snow's exiting the bathroom, the
'
95See id. at *4-*6. Significantly, the Reed court declared:
The importance of this requirement that the objector be "at the door" is underscored
by the care with which the [Randolph] Court crafted its opinion, referring always to
one who "is present at the scene and expressly refuses to consent," "a second occupant
physically present and refusing permission," "a fellow tenant [who] stood there
saying, 'stay out,"' "a present and objecting co-tenant," "a physically present
resident," and "a physically present inhabitant's express refusal of consent."
Id. at *5 (citations omitted).







20080 Pa. D. & C. 4th 262 (Pa. Ct. of Com. PI. 2006).
2 0
'See id. at 267-68.
202See id. at 269, 271 ("It is uncontested here that defendant unequivocally told the police
to get the 'F.. .' out of his house. Findings of fact, March 8, 2006, 11.").
203See id. at 272-73 n.6.
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police forced Snow to perform field sobriety tests in the home and arrested him for
driving under the influence.2
Recognizing that "[t]he facts in Randolph differ from the facts of [Snow] because
defendant here was present in the house when the police received consent to enter
their home,""2 5 the court nonetheless declared that "the rationale in Randolph is
equally applicable here."2' Extending Randolph's physical presence requirement
beyond the front door to include the home's interior, the court concluded that "the
warrantless presence of police in a home must cease when a physically present co-
occupant refuses to give police consent to remain . , 207 Seizing upon Randolph's
"widely shared social expectations ' rationale, the court reasoned:
[I]f a co-tenant at the entrance of a house has a widely shared social
expectation that his objection to another party's entry is reasonable and
should be obeyed, then it follows that a bathing co-tenant who raises this
same objection, even if it is raised after the initial warrantless entry is
likewise reasonable and should be honored. A reasonable guest, even if
he or she were already in a house, would certainly not feel any more
reason to stay in the house if a co-tenant ordered the guest out while
bathing, than if the same co-tenant denied entry to the guest at the front
door .... Defendant's objection from the bathroom in this case should
therefore hold the same weight as a person raising this objection at the
front door."°
Notably, if the Supreme Court in future third-party consent cases chooses to
extend its "widely shared social expectations" rationale over the alternative
assumption of risk theory, cases like Snow would arguably justify the expansion of
Randolph's physical presence requirement.
VII. PROPOSAL
As recent post-Randolph decisions illustrate, because most courts are reluctant to
examine police officer subjective motivations in Fourth Amendment cases, Randolph
is not the watershed case that Chief Justice Roberts feared. Indeed, post-Randolph
courts have gone the opposite direction, developing a variety of methods for
rejecting potential Randolph claims.
'°41d. at 264.
2 5Id. at 269.
2071d"
2
°SSee id. at 272 ("[I]f a co-tenant, while showering, demands to be left alone, no
recognized authority in law or social practice exists for another co-tenant to allow unwelcome
third parties to order the non-consenting co-tenant out of the bathroom. The warrantless
presence of the police became unreasonable at this point for Fourth Amendment purposes.").
291d. at 272. See also State v. Udell, 141 P.3d 612 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (granting
defendant's motion to suppress under Randolph where the defendant's wife consented to a
warrantless search while speaking with officers in the front yard, but where defendant
promptly and explicitly objected when officers entered the home pursuant to that consent).
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In light of the lower courts' narrow reading of Randolph, the Supreme Court
must either allow Randolph to die a slow death of narrow interpretation, or give teeth
to Randolph's protections through a broader interpretation of its core requirements.210
Despite recent criticisms of the consent doctrine,"' and despite arguments to the
contrary,2"2 I argue that Randolph should remain a relatively narrow holding, but that
it should be strengthened in cases of allegedly disputed consent. This Part proposes
a limited solution that would strengthen Randolph's protections for defendants who
claim to have objected to a co-tenant's consent, while simultaneously foreclosing
undue inquiry into police officer motivations.
A. The Case for Protecting Police Officer Motivations
Most significantly, my proposal would curtail undue scrutiny of police officer
motivations, a possibility that troubled Chief Judge Roberts in Randolph and would
undermine recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence-most notably Whren v. United
States.
213
In Whren, the Court held that as long as probable cause exists to conduct an
automobile search, it would not consider an officer's subjective motivations under
Fourth Amendment analysis, even if the defendant's race were the sole motivating
factor behind the officer's conduct.214 In Whren, plainclothed officers were
patrolling a known high drug area in an unmarked car. They passed a vehicle
occupied by four young black men. At this time, Officer Soto had probable cause to
believe that various provisions of the traffic code had been violated.215 When Officer
Soto made a U-turn in an attempt to head back toward the vehicle, the vehicle turned
suddenly to its right without signaling and sped off at an "unreasonable" speed.
Officer Soto then arrested the occupants and retrieved illegal drugs from the vehicle.
210See McCall, supra note 22, at 590 ("The rule announced by the [Randolph] majority is
murky and will probably require further refinement.").
211See, e.g., George C. Thomas IIl, Terrorism, Race and a New Approach to Consent
Searches, 73 Miss. L.J. 525, 541-42 (2003) ("Consent is an acid that has eaten away the
Fourth Amendment. It allows police to 'fish' for evidence without any suspicion whatsoever.
One police detective said that as many as ninety-eight percent of the searches he conducts are
consent searches . . . . Almost everyone gives consent when asked by police, and,
surprisingly, a large percentage of guilty suspects consent to the very search that will turn up
evidence against them.").
212See Williams, supra note 30, at 958-68 (arguing that courts should adopt a "broad"
interpretation of Randolph, where any express refusal of consent prior to the search would
suffice, and where the defendant's physical proximity at the time of the co-occupant's consent
would be irrelevant).
213Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
214See id. See also Michael L. Birzer & Gwynne Harris Birzer, Race Matters: A Critical
Look at Racial Profiling, It's a Matter for the Courts, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 643, 648 (2006),
available at http://www.sciencedirect.com (arguing that "the Whren decision allows police to
use race as a basis for a stop while hiding behind the traffic violation, no matter how minor, as
the pretext for the stop").
215Officers testified the truck had been stopped at a stop sign for an unusually long time of
nearly twenty seconds. Whren, 517 U.S. at 808.
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Petitioners challenged the legality of the stop and resulting seizure of the drugs.
Before the Supreme Court, they argued that the stop had not been justified by
probable cause to believe the petitioners were engaged in illegal drug-dealing
activity and that the asserted reason for approaching the vehicle-i.e., to warn of
traffic violations-was pretextual.216 Petitioners argued that, because probable cause
is easy to establish under traffic laws," 7 police might decide which motorists to stop
based on the race of the car's occupants. To avoid this danger, they argued, the
Fourth Amendment test for traffic stops should not be whether probable cause exists
to justify the stop, but rather whether a reasonable police officer would have made
the stopfor the stated reasons.2 8 Had the Court accepted the argument, petitioners'
proposed rule would have enabled courts to probe the reasonableness of the officer's
subjective motivations."'
Dismissing the claim, the Court held that the constitutional reasonableness of
traffic stops does not depend on the actual motivations of the arresting officers.22
Citing a long line of cases,22 the Court concluded:
We think these cases foreclose any argument that the constitutional
reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the
individual officers involved. We of course agree.. . that the Constitution
prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as
race. But the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally
discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the
Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.222
Along with the Court's refusal to scrutinize police officer motivations in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, there are several practical and theoretical problems with
1161d. at 810.
2 17See id. (arguing that the use of automobiles is so heavily and minutely regulated that





21 'd. at 812-13 (citing United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 (1983)
(holding that an otherwise valid warrantless boarding of a vessel by customs officials was not
rendered invalid "because the customs officers were accompanied by a Louisiana state
policeman, and were following an informant's tip that a vessel in the ship channel was thought
to be carrying marihuana," and dismissing the argument that an ulterior motive might
invalidate the search); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1 (1973) (holding that a
traffic-violation arrest would not be rendered invalid by the fact that it was "a mere pretext for
a narcotics search"); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (in wiretapping case,
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conditioning the outcome of a suppression motion on officer motivations.223 First, to
obtain the benefit of Randolph, courts require evidence consisting of something more
than the defendant's own testimony indicating that the police did, in fact, remove the
potential objector for the sake of avoiding a consent refusal.224 However, it is
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a defendant to divine the secret motivations
of the police without the police volunteering that information.225 As commentators
have noted, a dishonest officer has a strong incentive to lie if his subjective beliefs
will ultimately control the admissibility of the evidence,226 as in the typical Randolph
claim. Further, even the most truthful officer may be unable to testify with certainty
regarding his thought processes on an earlier occasion.2 7
Second, courts are understandably reluctant to infer ill motive on the part of the
police, and a judge forced to determine a police officer's motivations is predisposed
toward giving the officer the benefit of the doubt.228
Third, the cost of examining officer motivations is substantial because, by simply
engaging in the dispute, the integrity of the police and the judiciary suffer.229 As
Professor David Cole has argued, people's views about the legitimacy of authority
"are strongly connected to the judgments of the fairness of the procedures through
which authorities make decisions," and probing inquiries into those procedures may
create negative impressions of law enforcement.23 ° This, in turn, may make certain
individuals less likely to play by the rules.2 ' As such, "the catch is not worth the
2231 do not attempt to engage in a comprehensive discussion of the merits of subjective
versus objective standards of criminal procedure, as this endeavor is beyond the scope of this
article. For an overview of this debate, see DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 4 at 38-40.
2 24 See McClelland v. State, 155 P.3d 1013, 1019 (Wyo. 2007) (rejecting defendant's
contention that he was separated from individual who consented to the search so that his likely
objection to the search would not be heard, the court reasoned that "no such facts appear in
this record," that instead defendant "was arrested ... because [police] had probable cause to
believe that he had committed a felony," and that "[t]he record is clear that they wanted to
separate [defendant and consenter] so that [they] could not . . . conspire to tell consistent
stories").
225See Birzer & Birzer, supra note 214, at 648 ("While it is true that in a general sense, a
person often intends the consequences of his/her actions, it is virtually impossible to determine
by any objectivity what a person is thinking inside of his/her head. This has always been the
problem with proving any form of racial discrimination .....
2 26 See DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 4 at 39-40.
2271d
"
228See, e.g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 319 (1994) (holding that in determining
whether a subject is "in custody," courts are not to consider an "officer's subjective and
undisclosed view concerning whether the person being interrogated is a suspect."); Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990) (declaring that "evenhanded law enforcement is best
achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that
depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer").
229 See Strauss, supra note 8 at 244-45.
230See DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 172 (1999) (quoting TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 38 (1990)).
231See id.
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trouble of the hunt when courts set out to bag the secret motivations of
policemen.
23 2
Finally, today's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is grounded in objective
"reasonableness," '233 making objective standards most appropriate. Rodriguez, for
example, held that the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" requirement does not
"require[] that the government agent always be correct in his or her factual
determinations," but rather "that they always be reasonable."234 This makes sense.
When a warrantless search is conducted pursuant to a mistake of fact, the officer's
actions are truly inadvertent and consequently not unreasonable. And because police
often confront ambiguous situations when executing their duties, courts must allow
room for honest mistakes. 35 An objective reasonableness standard provides this
necessary wiggle room.236
232Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349,
436 (1974).
233See, e.g., Daniel R. Williams, Misplaced Angst: Another Look at Consent-Search
Jurisprudence, 82 IND. L.J. 69, 75 (2007) ("Reasonableness, not voluntariness, is the
touchstone of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Reasonableness, in practice if not in words,
has always been the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis."). See also Thomas, supra
note 211, at 529 (arguing that the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is
unprincipled and instead balances the degree of intrusion against the need for the search). See
also Scott v. Harris, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1777-78 (2007) ("Although respondent's attempt to craft
an easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth Amendment context is admirable, in the end we must
still slosh our way through the factbound morass of 'reasonableness.' Whether or not
[respondent's] actions constituted application of 'deadly force,' all that matters is whether
Scott's actions were reasonable."); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-84 (1974) (noting
that "[t]here are various elements . . . that can make a search of a person's house
'reasonable'--one of which is the consent of the person" with authority over the premises);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (declaring "the central inquiry under the Fourth
Amendment" to be "the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental
invasion of a citizen's personal security"); Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (invoking
a balancing test to determine "reasonableness," under which the individual's and society's
interests in administrative searches are weighed against one another).
234Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185.
235See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) ("Because many situations
which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous,
room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability. The rule
of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that
has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more would
unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the
mercy of the officers' whim or caprice.").
236In this manner, "evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of
objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of
mind of the officer." Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990). But note that if the true
inquiry in Fourth Amendment consent jurisprudence is the acceptability of methods of law
enforcement, then it makes sense to inquire into the subjective motivations of law enforcement
in order to more fully understand the reasons why an officer chooses to apply those particular
methods in a given case.
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B. Shifting Burden for Proving an Express Objection
In consent search cases, scrutiny of police officer motivations is problematic.
However, a limited solution that would simultaneously strengthen Randolph's
express objection requirement while respecting Chief Judge Roberts' concerns is
possible. This specific proposal would strengthen Randolph's protections in cases
where the police are aware that the defendant is physically present at the time of
consent, but where the dispute centers on the sufficiency of the defendant's
purported objection. As such, this proposal would impact category four of the five
post-Randolph case categories identified in Part I above.
Under this particular proposal, the government would carry additional burdens in
proving that the defendant did not, in fact, object to their warrantless search where
the evidence is hotly disputed on this issue. In particular, in situations where a
criminal defendant and at least one other witness claim that the defendant was
present and objected to the consent request, but where the searching officers testify
otherwise, the government would then be required to present more than the disputed
officer testimony to defeat the defendant's claim. If the defendant fails to present the
second witness's testimony, the burden would never shift to the government, and the
Randolph claim would typically be denied. If the defendant is able to meet his initial
burden, however, the burden would shift to the government to present evidence
beyond the officers' disputed testimony. If the government meets this burden, the
Randolph claim would generally be rejected. If not, the claim would be upheld.
Thus, this test would operate in a manner similar to established burden-shifting tests,
such as the Batson v. Kentucky test used for assessing prima facie cases of
discriminatory jury selection.237
Because the government would carry additional evidentiary burdens in many
future Randolph claims, this solution would have the likely effect of forcing law
enforcement to record either by audio or video their residential consent requests.
With the details of the exchange readily viewable and available for corroboration, it
is highly doubtful that any party would fabricate the details of a given request. Such
objective and reliable evidence would necessarily foreclose much of the inquiry into
officer motivations in these disputed cases, thereby easing the concerns of the
Randolph dissenters. On the flip side, because courts typically require a defendant to
present evidence consisting of something more than the defendant's own testimony
to establish that the police did, in fact, remove the potential objector for the sake of
avoiding a possible rejection,238 the routine videotaping of consent requests would
provide defendants with a meaningful chance to meet that burden.239 In addition,
237Baston v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986).
238See, e.g., McClelland v. State, 155 P.3d 1013, 1019 (Wyo. 2007) (in rejecting
defendant's contention that he was separated from individual who consented to the search so
that his likely objection to the search would not be heard, the court reasoned that "no such
facts appear in this record," that instead defendant "was arrested ... because [police] had
probable cause to believe that he had committed a felony," and that "[t]he record is clear that
they wanted to separate [defendant and consenter] so that [they] could not ... conspire to tell
consistent stories.").
239See Malcolm A. Heinicke, America's Warrantless Home Videos: An Analysis of the
Fourth Amendment Implications Raised When the Police Videotape Searches, 32 BEVERLY
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audio and video evidence is steadily gaining approval with the current Court, making
its widespread application less problematic than one might conceive.240
In addition to the more widespread use of objective audio or video evidence, this
solution would have four primary advantages. First, by giving the defendant .the
benefit of the doubt in a "he said, she said" Randolph situation, this proposal would
preserve the true spirit of the Randolph ruling-to respect the right of a physically
present defendant to refuse consent.
Second, this solution would comport with the current practice of requiring the
government, rather than the defendant, to prove exceptions to the warrant
requirement. The initial presumption in Fourth Amendment analysis is that
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, and as such, the government generally
bears the burden of proving exceptions to the warrant requirement.24" ' For example,
courts place the burden of proving an exigency on the government.242 And in third
HILLS B. ASS'N J. 77, 80-81 (1998) (arguing that "search subjects could ... use such tapes to
expose unlawful aspects of a[] [police] entry" into a home).
240A recent Supreme Court case illustrates the Court's willingness to rely on video
evidence in Fourth Amendment analysis. In Scott v. Harris, 127 S.Ct. 1769 (2007), the
Supreme Court overturned the Eleventh Circuit's refusal to grant qualified immunity to a
police officer who ended a high-speed chase by ramming the suspect's vehicle from behind.
In reaching this result, the Court focused on the disparity between the Eleventh Circuit's
statement of facts, and the video evidence of the chase itself. The Court first noted that, in
qualified immunity cases decided at the summary judgment stage, courts usually adopt the
plaintiffs version of the facts (as the Eleventh Circuit did here). Id. at 1775. However,
because the video contradicted the plaintiffs version of the facts in many respects, the Court
chose to depart from this typical practice. Id. The Court declared: "There is, however, an
added wrinkle in this case: existence in the record of a videotape capturing the events in
question . . . . The videotape quite clearly contradicts the version of the story told by
respondent and adopted by the Court of Appeals." Id. After noting several instances in which
the video contradicted the plaintiffs story, the Court concluded:
When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted
by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that
version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment. That
was the case here with regard to the factual issue whether respondent was driving in
such fashion as to endanger human life. Respondent's version of events is so utterly
discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed him. The Court
of Appeals should not have relied on such visible fiction; it should have viewed the
facts in the light depicted by the videotape.
Id. at 1776. Notably, the Court included digital access to the videotaped evidence within the
opinion itself. See id. at 1775 n.5 (containing a website address where the video can be
accessed and viewed).
24 1See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1979) (quoting United States v. Jeffers,
342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)) ("Because each exception to the warrant requirement invariably
impinges to some extent on the protective purpose of the Fourth Amendment, the few
situations in which a search may be conducted in the absence of a warrant have been carefully
delineated and 'the burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it."').
242See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 106 F.3d 70, 74 (5th Cir. 1997) ("The Government
bears the burden of demonstrating exigent circumstances existed.").
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party consent cases, the government has the burden of proving common authority.243
Placing this burden on the government makes sense. If an officer chooses not to take
advantage of the preferred means of conducting a search by failing to obtain a search
warrant,244 prosecutors should later account for the officer's actions by providing
proof that would justify disregarding that requirement.
Third, unlike other recent proposals for strengthening Randolph's protections,
245
this proposal works within the existing Matlock-Randolph framework. By working
within the existing framework, this specific proposal would respect Randolph's
decision to affirm Matlock and avoid substantial change from prior precedent.246
A final advantage of a proposal that would avoid overruling Matlock and
Randolph is its consistency with the assumption of risk theory underlying those
cases.2 47  As noted,2 48 Randolph's bright-line rule is ultimately grounded in the
243See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1990) ("[C]ommon authority ...
rests 'on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for
most purposes .. ".. ' The burden of establishing that common authority rests upon the State).
244In recent years, commentators have argued that the "warrant requirement" has become
more of a "preference" for warrants.
245With respect to the physical presence requirement, for example, one could argue that
rather than assigning criminal defendants the extremely difficult burden of proving that
officers intentionally avoided a Randolph situation through inappropriate removal from the
scene, the Court should simply require officers to seek the consent of any occupant actually
located within the home's curtilage at the time of request. This proposal would have two
primary advantages. First, by tying Randolph's physical presence requirement to established
Supreme Court jurisprudence extending the home's heightened Fourth Amendment
protections to the curtilage, this proposal would ratify the personal nature of Fourth
Amendment rights and would preserve the special protections afforded the home in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Second, this proposal would not unduly burden law enforcement,
as it would merely require officers to inquire as to whether any occupants are located on the
premises before making a consent request. Such a proposal, however, flatly contradicts
Randolph's statement that police need not "take affirmative steps to find a potentially
objecting co-tenant." Otherwise, "every co-tenant consent case would turn into a test about
the adequacy of the police's efforts to consult with a potential objector." Georgia v.
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 122 (2006).
246In leaving Matlock intact, the Court seemed expressly satisfied, stating, "[t]his is the
line we draw, and we think the formalism is justified," and noting that "there is practical value
in the simple clarity of complementary rules." Id.
247But there is a rather strong counter-argument here. Arguably, an occupant's ability to
control the premises is not subordinated to his joint occupant when the occupant remains on
the premises and is capable of objecting to access by others. See State v. Leach, 782 P.2d
1035, 1038-40 (Wash. 1989) (en banc) (adopting this argument); Black, supra note 111, at 333
("The risk assumed by an absent occupant of shared premises does not exist when he is
present. By sharing property with another, a person invites a dilution of his privacy ....
However, when present, a person has every right and every capability to withstand an invasion
of her privacy. It should logically follow that a person should have the same ability when
asserting her constitutionally protected rights against warrantless police searches."). In other
words, while it is reasonable for the law to presume that an individual has assumed the risk
that a co-tenant will permit others to enter during his absence, when that co-tenant is actually
present, it is not reasonable to imply that he has assumed such risk. See Leach, 782 P.2d 1035
at 1039. Indeed, this is precisely the reasoning underlying the Randolph decision, which
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HeinOnline  -- 56 Clev. St. L. Rev.  702 2008
41
McAllister: What the High Court giveth the Lower Courts taketh Away: How to P
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
WHAT THE HIGH COURT GIVETH
assumption of risk doctrine, and since the late 1960s, this doctrine has carried the
day in Fourth Amendment consent jurisprudence.249 Reverting back to the individual
rights/agency approach would only confuse Fourth Amendment doctrine, thereby
making law enforcement more difficult."'
The assumption of risk approach is not only consistent with prior Supreme Court
precedent and, at least in part, with the Randolph majority, but also with the views of
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia. In his Randolph dissent, in which Justice
Scalia joined, Chief Justice Roberts declared:
The rule the majority fashions does not implement the high office of the
Fourth Amendment to protect privacy, but instead provides protection on
a random and happenstance basis, protecting, for example, a co-occupant
who happens to be at the front door when the other occupant consents to a
search [where the assumption of risk doctrine would presumably not
apply], but not one napping or watching television in the next room
[where the assumption of risk doctrine would apply]. And the cost of
affording such random protection is great, as demonstrated by the
recurring cases in which abused spouses seek to authorize police entry
into a home they share with a nonconsenting abuser.
The correct approach to the question presented is clearly mapped out in
our precedents: The Fourth Amendment protects privacy. If an individual
shares information, papers, or places with another, he assumes the risk
that the other person will in turn share access to that information or those
papers or places with the government."'
declared that "there is no common understanding that one co-tenant generally has a right or
authority to prevail over the express wishes of another, whether the issue is the color of the
curtains or invitations to outsiders." See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 114 ("Since the co-tenant
wishing to open the door to a third party has no recognized authority in law or social practice
to prevail over a present and objecting co-tenant, his disputed invitation, without more, gives a
police officer no better claim to reasonableness in entering than the officer would have in the
absence of any consent at all."). See also Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth
Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 47, 63 (1974). While a co-inhabitant can be said to "assume
the risk" that his co-tenant will grant the police authority to consent to a search of their shared
premises in his absence, this risk only extends to co-tenants that are not present at the time of
consent or who have already been permissibly removed from the scene. See Randolph v.
State, 590 S.E.2d 834, 837 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
248See supra notes 191 and 192 and accompanying text.
249See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (upholding warrantless consent search of
shared duffle bag under the assumption of risk theory); see also McCall, supra note 22, at 592.
250The Randolph majority declared that "it would needlessly limit the capacity of the
police to respond to ostensibly legitimate opportunities in the field if we were to hold that...
police [must] take affirmative steps to find a potentially objecting co-tenant before acting on
the permission they had already received." Randolph, 547 U.S. at 122. Otherwise, "every co-
tenant consent case would turn into a test about the adequacy of the police's efforts to consult
with a potential objector." Id. Such rhetoric suggests that the Court is more concerned with
expedient law enforcement than with greatly expanding the scope of Fourth Amendment
protections.
2511d. at 128 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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While the assumption of risk theory is sound, the theory should only be applied
to actual instances of non-disputed consent. 2 The flaw in Chief Justice Roberts'
approach is that it would potentially expand the assumption of risk theory beyond its
justifiable ends. Arguably, an occupant's ability to control shared premises is not
subordinated to his joint occupant when the occupant remains on the premises and is
capable of objecting to access by others." 3 While it is reasonable to presume that an
individual has assumed the risk that a co-tenant will permit others to enter during his
absence, when that co-tenant is actually present, it no longer becomes reasonable to
infer such an assumption.254 This very rationale underlies the majority opinion in
Randolph, which declares that "there is no common understanding that one co-tenant
generally has a right or authority to prevail over the express wishes of another,
whether the issue is the color of the curtains or invitations to outsiders." '255 In short,
while a tenant can be said to "assume the risk" that his co-tenant will consent to a
search of their shared premises in his absence, this risk only extends to co-tenants
who are not present at the time of consent or who have been permissibly removed
from the scene.256
VIII. CONCLUSION
Beginning in 1969 with Frazier v. Cupp and extending through early 2006, the
Supreme Court followed a trend of expanding the scope of lawful warrantless
consent searches and correspondingly limiting privacy rights under the Fourth
Amendment. Most likely, Randolph will be remembered as a bump along the road
toward an ever-expanding consent doctrine. 257  Despite Chief Justice Roberts'
concerns, post-Randolph case law reveals that Randolph is not the watershed case its
dissenters feared. Not a single post-Randolph case in the two years following
Randolph has struck down an otherwise valid search on grounds of unjustifiable
252See McCall, supra note 22, at 606 (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts's reasoning
would expand the "assumption of risk" theory to the point where it "decimates the Fourth
Amendment protections" of the ninety percent of Americans who live with one or more other
individuals, and that this expansion is based on the flawed premise that a present, objecting
co-occupant surrenders his ability to object to a warrantless search merely by deciding to live
with another person).
2 53See State v. Leach, 782 P.2d 1035, 1038-40 (Wash. 1989) (en banc) (adopting this
argument); Black, supra note I ll, at 333 ("The risk assumed by an absent occupant of shared
premises does not exist when he is present. By sharing property with another, a person invites
a dilution of his privacy .... However, when present, a person has every right and every
capability to withstand an invasion of her privacy. It should logically follow that a person
should have the same ability when asserting her constitutionally protected rights against
warrantless police searches.").
254See Leach, 782 P.2d at 1039.
255See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 114 ("Since the co-tenant wishing to open the door to a third
party has no recognized authority in law or social practice to prevail over a present and
objecting co-tenant, his disputed invitation, without more, gives a police officer no better
claim to reasonableness in entering than the officer would have in the absence of any consent
at all."); see also Weinreb, supra note 247, at 63.
256See Randolph v. State, 590 S.E.2d 834, 837 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
257See Fiske, supra note 110, at 738-39.
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pretext. Only a handful of cases have explicitly extended the Randolph rule, and the
leading case in this category was quickly vacated and overruled. Because post-
Randolph courts have developed multiple means of rejecting an otherwise legitimate
Randolph claim, the Court must now consider whether to allow Randolph to die a
slow death of narrow interpretation. To prevent the further erosion of Randolph
without overruling Matlock and without deviating from the assumption of risk
doctrine, the Court should strengthen Randolph's express objection requirement
while simultaneously preventing unnecessary intrusion into officer motivations.
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IX. APPENDIX A
In preparing this Article, the author carefully reviewed all post-Randolph
opinions published between March 2006 and March 2008 that provide more than a
cursory discussion of the Randolph claim. The following cases were included in the
author's review:
FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS
1) United States v. Wilburn, 473 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2007).
2) United States v. Parker, 469 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 2006).
3) United States v. DiModica, 468 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 2006).
4) United States v. Marasco, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (D. Neb. 2006), affd in
pertinent part, 487 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2007).
5) United States v. Alama, 486 F.3d 1062 (8th Cir. 2007).
6) United States v. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2006), reh 'g en banc
granted and opinion vacated, 459 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2007).
7) United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
8) United States v. Uscanga-Ramirez, 475 F.3d 1024 (8th Cir. 2007).
9) United States v. McKerrell, 491 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2007).
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT OPINIONS
10) United States v. Murphy, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1192-93 (D. Kan. 2006).
11) State v. Hurt, 743 N.W.2d 102 (N.D. Ind. 2007).
12) United States v. Sims,435 F. Supp. 2d 542 (S.D. Miss. 2006).
13) United States v. McCurdy, 480 F. Supp. 2d 380 (D. Me. 2007).
14) United States v. Sandoval-Espana, 459 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.R.I. 2006).
15) United States v. Davis, No. 1:06-CR-69, 2006 WL 2644987 (W.D. Mich.
Sept. 14, 2006).
16) United States v. Dominguez-Ramirez, No. 5:06-CR-6-OC- I OGRJ, 2006 WL
1704461 (M.D. Fla. June 8, 2006).
17) United States v. Church, No. 1:06:CR:292, 2007 WL 689890 (W.D. Mich.
Mar. 2, 2007).
18) United States v. Cos, No. CR 05-1619JB, 2006 WL 4093033 (D.N.M. May
17,2006).
19) United States v. Childers, No. CR 106-074, 2006 WL 3289935 (S.D. Ga.
Nov. 8, 2006).
20) United States v. Groves, No. 3:04-CR-76, 2007 WL 171916 (N.D. Ind. Jan.
17,2007).
STATE COURT OPINIONS
21) People v. Ledesma, 140 P.3d 657 (Cal. 2006).
22) Donaldv. State, 903 A.2d 315, 321 (Del. 2006).
23) People v. Mikrut, 864 N.E.2d 958 (I11. App. Ct. 2007).
24) Starks v. State, 846 N.E.2d 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
25) Christian v. State, 914 A.2d 151 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007).
26) People v. Lapworth, 730 N.W.2d 258 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006).
27) Casteelv. State, 131 P.3d 1 (Nev. 2006).
28) Commonwealth v. Yancoskie, 915 A.2d 111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
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29) Commonwealth v. Snow, 80 Pa. D. & C.4th 262 (Pa. Ct. of Corn. Pl. 2006).
30) Brown v. State, 212 S.W.3d 851 (Tex. App. 2006).
31) Odom v. State, 200 S.W.3d 333 (Tex. App. 2006).
32) State v. Udell, 141 P.3d 612 (Utah Ct. App. 2006).
33) Glenn v. Commonwealth, 633 S.E.2d 205 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
34) McClellandv. State, 155 P.3d 1013 (Wyo. 2007).
UNREPORTED OPINIONS
35) Pratt v. United States, 214 Fed. Appx. 532 (6th Cir. Jan. 22, 2007)
(unreported).
36) United States v. Jones, 184 Fed. Appx. 943 (11 th Cir. June 22, 2006)
(unreported).
37) United States v. Williams, No. 06-20051-B, 2006 WL 3151548 (W.D. Tenn.
Nov. 1, 2006) (unreported).
38) Taylor v. Brontoli, No. 1:04-CV-0487, 2007 WL 1359713 (N.D.N.Y. May
8, 2007) (unreported).
39) United States v. Henderson, No. 04 CR 697, 2006 WL 3469538 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 29, 2006) (unreported).
40) United States v. Crosbie, No. 06-047-CG, 2006 WL 1663667 (S.D. Ala.
June 9, 2006) (unreported).
41) United States v. Cantrell, No. 04-03127-02-CR-S-ODS, 2006 WL 3391406
(W.D. Mo. Nov. 22, 2006) (unreported).
42) United States v. Wilson, No. 8:06CR145, 2006 WL 3253477 (D. Neb. Nov.
8, 2006) (unreported).
43) United States v. Young, No. 5:05CR63-01-02, 2006 WL 1302667 (N.D.
W.Va. May 9, 2006) (unreported).
44) United States v. Reed, No. 3:06-CR-75 RM, 2006 WL 2252515 (N.D. Ind.
Aug. 3, 2006) (unreported).
45) Moore v. Andreno, No. 3:05-cv-0175, 2006 WL 2008712 (N.D.N.Y. July
17, 2006) (unreported).
46) People v. Gomez, No. B179154, 2006 WL 1609367 (Cal. Ct. App. June 13,
2006) (unreported).
47) People v. Gil, No. B185496, 2006 WL 2831022 (Cal. App. Oct. 5, 2006)
(unreported).
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